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International Norm Diffusion in the Pimicikamak Cree Nation: 
A Model of Legal Mediation 
 
Galit A. Sarfaty† 
 





Over 1000 people from across the globe convene in Geneva, Switzerland 
every summer to voice their concerns on indigenous rights.  This pilgrimage to 
the week-long United Nations (U.N.) Working Group on Indigenous Populations 
has taken place every year since its inception in 1982, when only about thirty 
people attended.  The increasingly global nature of political activism among 
indigenous peoples is evident in the growing number of participants at the 
Working Group,1 the U.N.’s recent creation of a Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues to advise its Economic and Social Council,2 and the adoption of the U.N. 
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples by the Human Rights 
Council in 2006.3  The language of human rights has become a platform for 
                                                 
† Visiting Fellow, Human Rights Program, Harvard Law School; Graduate Fellow, Edmond J. 
Safra Center for Ethics, Harvard University; J.D., Yale Law School, 2005; Ph.D. candidate in 
Anthropology, University of Chicago; M.A., University of Chicago, 2001; A.B., Harvard College, 
2000.  I am indebted to Milner Ball, Rachel Brewster, William Braun, John Comaroff, Ryan 
Goodman, Oona Hathaway, Libra Hilde, Michael Kessler, Harold Hongju Koh, Jacob Levy, 
David Maybury-Lewis, Sally Engle Merry, Sally Falk Moore, Ronald Niezen, Robert Post, 
Raymond Robinson, Cora True-Frost, Gerald Zuriff, and especially Adam Saunders for their 
comments and support.  
1 See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996); Chris Tennant, 
Indigenous Peoples, International Institutions, and the International Legal Literature from 1945-
1993, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 1 (1994). 
2 The U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) created the Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues on July 28, 2000.  According to ECOSOC Resolution 2000/22, the Permanent Forum “shall 
serve as an advisory body to the Council with a mandate to discuss indigenous issues within the 
mandate of the Council relating to economic and social development, culture, the environment, 
education, health and human rights.”  U.N. Doc. E/RES/2000/22 (July 28, 2000).  See also John 
Carey & Siegfried Wiessner, A New United Nations Subsidiary Organ: The Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues, AM. SOC. INT’L L. INSIGHT 67 (2001), available at 
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh67.htm. 
3 On June 29, 2006, the U.N. Human Rights Council passed a resolution recommending that the 
General Assemby adopt the U.N. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which 
was finalized in 1994.  While the declaration would not be binding on states, it could serve as a 
tool for pressuring states to protect indigenous rights.  U.N. Doc. A/HRC/1/L.10 (June 30, 2006). 
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organizing the international indigenous movement.  Its rhetoric has enabled 
indigenous peoples to claim legitimacy for their campaigns for political, 
economic, and cultural autonomy.  Political mobilization around rights claims has 
publicized the plight of indigenous peoples, from the Kayapó of Brazil to the 
Maori of New Zealand, and has given them a common voice with which to unite 
on a global level and lobby for domestic policy change.   
 
Yet, what happens when these indigenous peoples return to their 
communities after having learned, employed, and even influenced international 
norms?  Do they adapt local laws in relation to the international norms that they 
have internalized?  For many decades, local communities like indigenous groups 
have been using the moral authority and persuasive power of international law as 
leverage against states.  They have appropriated the global legal discourse of 
human rights as a tool for empowerment.  But local groups do not just absorb 
international norms or redeploy them against states; they are also transformed by 
these norms in a variety of ways, particularly, in their laws and governing 
institutions.  The issue is: How are localities transformed by their contact with 
international norms?  When an indigenous community is exposed to international 
human rights law (e.g., through a local NGO or their own participation in an 
international campaign), how does that affect its local customs and laws, 
including its negotiation with states?  Ethnographic studies of local law-making 
within communities are needed to examine the micro-level mediation process 
among local, state, and international law.   
 
Scholars have analyzed the diffusion of international norms across 
borders, but they tend to focus on states rather than localities.  There is a gap in 
the legal scholarship on how norms are translated on the local level.  International 
legal scholars have described the transnational legal process whereby 
transnational actors interact and cause international norms to become internalized 
into domestic structures.4  They have also analyzed how international law changes 
state behavior, through legal means like treaty ratification or social forces like 
acculturation.5  Political scientists have explained how transnational advocacy 
networks use international law to pressure states, and thus create a boomerang 
effect towards domestic policy change.6  They have also described how state 
                                                 
4 See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996); Harold 
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) (review 
essay). 
5 See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How To Influence States: Socialization and International 
Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties 
Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002). 
6 See MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY 
NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998). 
- 3 - 
governments become socialized to conform to international human rights norms.7  
But what happens on the local level, when international norms become 
internalized in local legal systems?  That is, how do communities give meaning to 
international norms in relation to state and local laws?     
 
In an effort to address these inquiries, this Article examines the process of 
international norm diffusion on the ground—where international law is shaping 
how local actors construct their laws and legal institutions.  Based on empirical 
evidence, I analyze how international norms can become embedded in an 
indigenous community and influence its law-making in a way that mediates 
between state and local laws.  International norms can provide a mechanism not 
just for domestic reform, but also for local reform.  Local actors may design 
innovative governing structures that borrow from state and international law while 
also adapting cultural norms.   
 
I elaborate on this process of legal mediation by presenting a case study of 
the Pimicikamak Cree Nation (pronounced “Pi-mi-chi-ca-mak”), an indigenous 
people living in Cross Lake, a small town in Manitoba, Canada.  This study is 
based on my ethnographic field research at the Cree reservation in 1999 and 2000, 
as well as follow-up research in the years since that time.8  Having suffered from 
the destructive effects of a hydroelectric dam constructed in the 1970s, the Cree 
have actively lobbied the Canadian government for the compensation promised to 
them over 25 years ago.  Since 1998, they have appealed to the U.N. to pressure 
Canada and have invoked international law to assert their right to self-
determination.  As part of this process, the Cree have developed a unique 
government as a basis for their new relationship with Canada––one that demands 
respect for their fundamental human rights, while also incorporating aspects of 
Canadian law and adapting customary Cree law.9   
                                                 
7 See THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE (Risse et 
al. eds., 1999) (constructing a five phase “spiral model” of socialization to international human 
rights norms). 
8 During my field research, I compiled data from semi-structured interviews, analysis of 
government documents in Cross Lake and Winnipeg, and visits to the United Nations in Geneva.    
9 My use of the terms “custom” and “customary law” refers to the de facto habits that have 
developed in a people’s practices and institutions, based on a group’s cultural traditions.  It does 
not imply that there exists an authoritative expression of a people’s culture.  While I often refer to 
the Cree Nation as a collectivity with customary practices and laws, I recognize that there exists a 
multiplicity of perspectives within the group that I am not able to fully account for.  Thus, my 
discussion of the Cree does not presuppose a single ethnic identity.  It is a construction based on 
my personal encounters with different community members and my approximation of internal 
differences. 
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 By designing a government that integrates Canadian and international law 
into their own legal institutions while also adapting Cree cultural norms, the Cree 
are engaging in legal mediation.  This process describes a web of overlapping 
identifications with the local, state, and international legal spheres.  Yet legal 
mediation refers to more than just an interaction between multiple legal orders in 
the same social field, referred by some scholars as “legal pluralism.”10  It 
describes a process of negotiation among multiple normative commitments and 
legal entities.  Under legal mediation, local actors play an important role in 
shaping how international norms become internalized within their communities.  
They influence how international human rights norms are received and 
incorporated in local institutions, and how they interact with state and non-state 
norms (e.g., religious norms or cultural practices).      
 
The case of the Cree thus demonstrates how the global discourse of human 
rights is becoming incorporated into local communities as indigenous peoples are 
“redefining their projects in the global space of . . . human rights.”11  Their 
strategic use of human rights discourse is indicative of the growing role played by 
international law in their societies.  International human rights law gives them 
political leverage when negotiating with the states in which they reside.  It has 
also led groups like the Cree to adapt their customary law to accommodate their 
relationship to other legal institutions.  The dialectical process of legal mediation, 
whereby indigenous groups shift between different normative communities, 
represents their multi-layered identifications within the local, state, and 
international spheres. 
 
 The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows.  Part I reviews existing 
literature from international law and international relations on norm diffusion and 
internalization.  I identify the gaps in the literature, including how norm 
internalization occurs in local settings.  I then argue that ethnographic studies can 
shed light on these local processes, particularly how international human rights 
norms can shape law-making in local communities.  When analyzing these 
processes, theories of legal pluralism provide useful insights.  I review 
scholarship on legal pluralism and then build on these theories to discuss the 
model of “legal mediation.”  Under this model, local actors are able to mediate 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW, SCIENCE, 
AND POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION (1995); John Griffiths, What is Legal 
Pluralism?, 24 J. LEG. PLURALISM 1 (1986); Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 869 (1988); Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 
13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443 (1992). 
11 Michael Kearney, The Local and the Global: The Anthropology of Globalization and 
Transnationalism, 24 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 547, 560 (1995).  
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between local law and state law by borrowing from international law.  As I 
describe in Part I.B, communities, particularly indigenous groups, are also 
lobbying state and international institutions to recognize local norms and 
customary practices.  Thus, not only are multiple types of legal norms interacting 
within local settings, but they are also shaping and being shaped by one another.  
Finally, I analyze how indigenous peoples are adapting their local laws as they 
internalize international norms.   
 
 Part II offers ethnographic evidence of the diffusion of international norms 
in a local community.  I first set out a brief narrative of the Pimicikamak Cree 
Nation, including the historical events that spurred its appeals to the U.N.  This 
case study exemplifies an indigenous people that is appealing to international law 
to win compensation from a state government and to assert its right to self-
government.  As they speak the language of international human rights law, the 
Cree are promoting their use of customary law as a legitimate basis for their 
political autonomy.  I then describe how the Cree are participating in transnational 
advocacy networks for indigenous rights and the environment.  Lastly, I discuss 
how they are asserting their right as a people to self-determination, which they 
interpret as an on-going negotiation between multiple normative communities.   
 
 In Part III, I analyze the Pimicikamak Cree Nation’s recently adapted local 
government as an example of legal mediation.  I first describe how the Cree are 
preserving cultural norms as they assert their right to self-government.  I then 
analyze how they have adapted these norms to accommodate state laws, and have 
incorporated international norms into their official communications and local 
political discourse.  Finally, I identify possible external and internal obstacles to 
legal mediation as I consider the ways in which this model could be most 
effectively utilized by local communities. 
 
I.   LOCALIZING THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL NORM DIFFUSION 
 
Legal scholarship on international norm diffusion, including the 
development, circulation, and internalization of norms, has traditionally focused 
on states and how international law shapes state behavior.  Analyses of norm 
internalization have been mostly limited to state legal systems.  For example, 
transnational legal process theory examines the interface between international 
norms and domestic legal processes in an attempt to answer the question of why 
nations obey international law.12  The theory outlines three phases: interaction, 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., Michael B. Likosky, Introduction to TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES: 
GLOBALISATION AND POWER DISPARITIES xxiv (Michael B. Likosky ed., 2002); Sally Falk Moore, 
An International Legal Regime and the Context of Conditionality, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
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interpretation, and internalization. “Those seeking to embed certain norms into 
national conduct seek to trigger interactions that yield legal interpretations that 
are then internalized into the domestic law of even resistant nation states.”13  Yet, 
as one scholar recently noted, “more is needed to fully flesh out the idea of 
transnational legal process in order to see how norm internalization actually takes 
place outside of the official organs of government.”14  That is, how does norm 
internalization occur in local settings?15    
 
Existing literature in international relations similarly emphasizes the 
spread of norms from transnational and international actors to states.16  
Constructivist theories treat transnational actors and their interests as 
“constructed” by their social context.17  By shaping that context, “[t]he 
international system can change what states want.”18  These accounts, however, 
do not adequately describe how transnational ideas shape local communities.  One 
of the prominent theories in international relations is that of Martha Finnemore 
and Kathryn Sikkink.  According to their theory, the life-cycle of norms consists 
of three stages: norm emergence, norm acceptance (or what is termed a “norm 
cascade”), and norm internalization.19  The first stage is characterized by 
persuasion of states by “norm entrepreneurs”; the second by socialization of states 
to become norm followers; and the third by wide acceptance of norms and their 
                                                                                                                                     
PROCESSES: GLOBALISATION AND POWER DISPARITIES 333 (Michael B. Likosky ed., 2002); Koh, 
Transnational Legal Process, supra note 4; Koh, Why do Nations Obey International Law?, supra 
note 4; Catherine Powell, The Role of Transnational Norm Entrepreneurs in the U.S. “War on 
Terrorism,” 5 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 47 (2004). 
13 Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process After September 11th, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L 
L. 337, 339 (2004). 
14 Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNT’L L. 485, 545 (2005). 
15 The Chayes’ managerial model and Thomas Franck’s fairness model similarly focus on states in 
their theories of norm compliance.  See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE 
NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); 
THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995).  
16 See, e.g., KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 6; Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International 
Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887 (1998); Thomas Risse & Kathryn 
Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: 
Introduction, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (Thomas Risse et al., eds. 1999). 
17 See, e.g., MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1996); THE 
POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 16; John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang 
Together: Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52 INT’L ORG. 855 (1998); 
Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics, 
46 INT'L ORG. 391 (1992). 
18 FINNEMORE, supra note 17, at 5. 
19 Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 16. 
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achievement of a “taken-for-granted” quality.20  Yet, this theory, like 
transnational legal process, focuses on norm diffusion in states, rather than in 
localities.  It does not explain the process by which international norms interact 
with local norms and change communities. 
 
  Scholars of international norm diffusion have paid little attention to the 
processes through which it occurs on the ground.  What is missing is an analysis 
of the local—that is, how local communities internalize international norms, and 
in particular, how these norms interact with local and state norms and shape local 
institutions.  In other words, one must study how non-state norms “affect the way 
in which an international norm is received . . . on the ground.”21  It is important to 
understand how international norms affect local law-making and the relationship 
between communities and the states in which they reside.  Empirical research, 
including ethnographic case studies, can illuminate local processes and fill the 
gaps that exist in legal scholarship.  It is also useful to consider theories of legal 
pluralism, which provide valuable insights for the model of legal mediation that I 
present in Section I.B below. 
 
A. Theories of Legal Pluralism  
 
In an age of globalization, people are affiliated with multiple, often 
overlapping communities that generate legal norms.22  How does one analyze the 
interaction between multiple legal entities?  How do local actors negotiate 
between conflicting normative commitments, including local, state, and 
international norms?  A number of so-called “legal pluralism” theories have 
attempted to describe this phenomenon based on anthropological and sociolegal 
studies.  These theories do not only posit the coexistence of more than one legal 
system within a social field (e.g., international, state, and local legal systems).23  
They also attempt to model the relationships between these legal spheres.24  In 
reviewing classic and contemporary accounts of legal pluralism, I will extract 
insights that will help us analyze the local internalization of international norms.   
 
 Social theorists have developed models of legal pluralism to describe the 
existence of concurrent legal orders.  Yet until recently, they have mostly failed to 
recognize the reciprocal and constantly changing relationship between them.  
                                                 
20 Id. 
21 Berman, supra note 14, at 539.  
22 See id. at 507. 
23 See, e.g., John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1 
(1986).  
24 See, e.g., Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869, 879 (1988). 
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From the early twentieth century through the 1970s, studies examined colonized 
societies, focusing on the relationships of dominance and resistance between state 
and local normative orders.  According to Leopold Pospisil, legal systems are 
superimposed upon one another as hierarchical levels, which can include the state, 
community, lineage, and family, among other subgroups.25  A person is 
simultaneously a member of multiple subgroups and may be subject to competing 
legal obligations.  Pospisil’s theory does not allow for the continuous interplay 
between different legal systems within a society; nor does it permit the 
intermingling of levels that would result from legal systems borrowing concepts 
from one another.   
 
 Another leading theory of legal pluralism is that of legal scholar and 
anthropologist Sally Falk Moore.  Moore’s notable contribution to this literature 
rejects Pospisil’s notion of legal levels, where multiple legal systems form a 
hierarchy with varying degrees of inclusiveness, with the state holding the 
monopoly of power.  Moore claims that Pospisil focuses on state-made formal 
legal rules and does not sufficiently address the rule-making and rule-enforcing 
capacities of informal organizations.26  Moore’s own model of legal pluralism is 
based not on legal levels but rather on a network of “semi-autonomous social 
fields,” defined by their rule-making capacity and their vulnerability to outside 
forces.27  She describes all social locales as semi-autonomous because they are 
“simultaneously set in a larger social matrix which can, and does, affect and 
invade [them], sometimes at the invitation of persons inside [them], sometimes at 
[their] own instance.”28   
 
 In the past two decades since Moore introduced her theory, legal pluralism 
has experienced a resurgence of interest among scholars studying non-colonized 
societies, including communities in the United States and Europe, who have 
challenged the classic view of legal systems as static and non-interacting.29  
Recent scholars recognize “the dialectic, mutually constitutive relation between 
state law and other normative orders,” and the dynamics of power between them; 
they construct legal identities as fluid, provisional, and contested.30  According to 
                                                 
25 See LEOPOLD POSPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW: A COMPARATIVE THEORY 125 (1971). 
26 See SALLY FALK MOORE, LAW AS PROCESS: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH 24, 57 (1978). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 56. 
29 See, e.g., David M. Engel, Law, Time, and Community, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 605 (1987); 
Carol Greenhouse, Nature is to Culture as Praying is to Suing: Legal Pluralism in an American 
Suburb, 20 J. OF LEG. PLURALISM 17 (1982); Sally Engle Merry, Going to Court: Strategies of 
Dispute Management in an American Urban Neighborhood, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 891 (1979).  
For a review of “classic” and “new” scholarship on legal pluralism, see Merry, supra note 24. 
30 Merry, supra note 24, at 880. 
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Gunther Teubner, legal pluralism is no longer “a set of conflicting social norms 
but . . . a multiplicity of diverse communicative processes in a given social field 
that observe social action under the binary code of legal/illegal.”31  Teubner 
focuses on the symbolic systems inscribed in legal orders.  He extends Moore’s 
notion of law as process as he describes the legal system as an autopoietic system 
of interwoven domains and circular relations continually being modified.32   
 
 The dynamic process of multiple networks of intersecting and 
interpenetrating legal orders is described by Boaventura de Sousa Santos as 
“interlegality.”33  He analyzes the transnationalization of the indigenous peoples’ 
movement as creating a cosmopolitan legal terrain “composing different layers, 
all of them in force together but never in a uniform fashion, all of them in the 
same moment but always as a momentary convergence of different temporal 
projections.”34  Every legal sphere is historically formed and the product of 
interactions with other legal spheres, challenging the classic jurisprudential view 
of separate and uniform legal systems. 
 
 Continuing this critique of the classic view of legal systems, scholars like 
Francis Snyder and Sally Engle Merry have introduced analytic frameworks for 
understanding transnational law-making.  Snyder studies the international trade in 
toys between the European Union and China as a global economic network of 
legal sites, including the European Union, the World Trade Organization, and 
multinational corporations.  According to Snyder, “global legal pluralism” is 
being formed in the interaction between EU law, U.S. law, World Trade 
Organization law, Chinese law, codes of conduct from multinational corporations 
and trade associations, and international customs conventions.35  Drawing on 
Teubner’s work, he defines “global legal pluralism” as a network of interwoven 
sets of norms.36  Another scholar, Sally Engle Merry, has recently proposed a 
“spatial global legal pluralism,” which “incorporates dimensions of power, 
meaning, and social relationships into a legal pluralist framework along with an 
analysis of spatial relationships.”37  This version of legal pluralism conceptualizes 
                                                 
31 Gunther Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW 
WITHOUT A STATE 14 (1997). 
32 See GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM 11 (1993). 
33 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Conception of 
Law, 14 J. LAW & SOC’Y. 279, 298 (1987).  
34 SANTOS, supra note 10, at 457.  
35 Francis Snyder, Governing Economic Globalization: Global Legal Pluralism and European 
Union Law, 5 EUROPEAN L.J. 334 (1999). 
36 Id. at 335. 
37 Sally Engle Merry, International Law and Sociolegal Scholarship: Towards a Spatial Legal 
Pluralism 4-5 (Jan. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).  
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the spatial dimensions of laws in order to analyze their transnational movement 
and the places where they intersect, overlap, and conflict.   It is a theoretically rich 
framework for understanding “the way pockets of legal regimes jump to new 
regions through transplants, global legal institutions, ratification of human rights 
treaties, the creation of special tribunals, and myriad other processes.”38      
 
 Building on rich ethnographies, theories of legal pluralism—from early 
scholars like Pospisil and Moore to recent ones like Merry, Snyder, Santos, and 
Teubner—attempt to understand local settings where multiple legal orders 
interact.  Instead of focusing only on those norms with enforcement power, legal 
pluralists “look to whether members of various shifting and overlapping 
communities feel themselves bound by articulated norms.”39  I borrow insights 
from these theories in developing a model of legal mediation, described in the 
following section.  My model focuses on how legal structures are not only 
interacting within common locales, but are also shaping and being shaped by one 
another.   
 
B. Legal Mediation 
 
Based on my study of the Pimicikamak Cree Nation’s experience, I build 
on theories of legal pluralism to further analyze the exchange between multiple 
normative communities that occurs on the local level.  Local groups like the Cree 
are taking an active role in integrating state and international norms into their own 
legal institutions while also adapting their local norms and cultural practices.  
Legal mediation describes this process of negotiation between multiple legal 
spheres.  Local actors play an important role in legal mediation by shaping how 
international norms get internalized within their communities.   
 
International law is central to the process of legal mediation.  Groups 
appeal to international law as a means of exerting pressure on states, which may 
be discriminating against them.40  In so doing, they are familiarizing themselves 
with international norms and asserting their rights, such as indigenous peoples’ 
right to self-determination.  As they assert their political autonomy, local groups 
are adopting new laws that borrow from international and state law.  Most groups 
                                                 
38 Id. at 24. 
39 Berman, supra note 14, at 539. 
40 See generally, KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 6. 
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are not aspiring for statehood when seeking self-determination, but rather the 
survival of their cultural communities.41  
 
The process of legal mediation is an especially apt model for indigenous 
communities because of their status as self-governing, culturally cohesive peoples 
prior to their subjection to processes of colonization in their own territories.  
Indigenous groups are seeking recognition of their customs and laws while also 
lobbying for national and international policy reform.  Contact with international 
institutions and participation in transnational advocacy networks may lead 
communities to adapt their local norms accordingly.  In this way, the flow of ideas 
moves in both directions, with national and international norms being influenced 
by local norms.  There is thus a “feedback loop,” so that “local actors deploying 
or resisting national or international norms may well subvert or transform them, 
and the resulting transformation is sure to seep back ‘up’ so that, over time, the 
‘international’ norm is transformed as well.”42  In the subsections below, I 
describe a number of instances where state and international law and institutions 
are recognizing and incorporating customary norms and indigenous law.  I then 
explain how indigenous peoples participating in the international human rights 
community are negotiating the meaning and application of customary laws and 
practices as they integrate international and domestic norms.  
 
1.   Adaptation of State and International Law  
 
As indigenous communities lobby state and international institutions for 
policy reform and begin to adapt their own norms accordingly, there is a feedback 
loop and a sharing of concepts among legal orders.  The interaction of multiple 
normative communities is leading to adaptations in state and international norms 
as well.  Given the asymmetry of power between local norms and state and 
international norms, the sharing of concepts is not completely reciprocal and local 
norms are certainly influenced to a greater degree.  However, there are some signs 
that international and national institutions are beginning to recognize the validity 
of local norms, particularly indigenous customs and laws.  There are also a 
number of examples of institutions incorporating indigenous norms. 
 
Many international bodies, including the United Nations, the World 
Intellectual Property Organization, and the World Bank, have given more 
attention to indigenous issues and even recognized indigenous customs in their 
                                                 
41 See Maivan Clech Lam, Making Room for Peoples at the United Nations: Thoughts Provoked 
by Indigenous Claims to Self-Determination, 25 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 603 (1992); Sally Engle 
Merry, Anthropology and International Law, 35 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY  295 (2006). 
42 Berman, supra note 14, at 551. 
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policies.  Over the last few decades, the United Nations (U.N.) has drafted an 
international human rights instrument on the rights of indigenous peoples and 
created international fora for them to voice their concerns.  The U.N. Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations served as the primary arena for indigenous 
peoples during the 1980s and 1990s.  In 2000, the U.N. created the Permanent 
Forum on Indigenous Issues as an advisory body that reports directly to its 
Economic and Social Council.  The Permanent Forum, which holds an annual 
two-week session in New York City, is jointly composed of state representatives 
and indigenous peoples’ representatives (eight government appointees and eight 
indigenous peoples).  This is the first time that state and non-state representatives 
have been accorded parity in a U.N. permanent body.43  Following the creation of 
the Permanent Forum, the United Nations appointed the first Special Rapporteur 
on the Situation of the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous 
People.44  The most recent development has been the adoption of the U.N. Draft 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples by the U.N. Human Rights 
Council.45   
 
Other international organizations have similarly supported the protection 
of indigenous rights.  The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), an 
agency of the United Nations, has sponsored activities in support of the traditional 
knowledge of native peoples.  After assembling its first annual Roundtable on 
Indigenous Intellectual Property in 1998, WIPO undertook fact-finding missions 
to native communities worldwide to study current approaches to the protection of 
intellectual property rights of holders of indigenous knowledge, innovations, and 
culture.  In 2000, it established an Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual 
Property, Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge, and Expression of Folklore.  
One of the aims of this body is to encourage the development of national 
intellectual property legislation to protect indigenous knowledge and folklore.  In 
this way, international institutions like WIPO are promoting the recognition of 
indigenous norms and customs by state legal systems. 
 
Finally, development aid agencies like the World Bank have integrated 
indigenous norms into their investment projects.  In 1991, the Bank issued 
operational directive (OD) 4.20, which was designed to “avoid or mitigate 
potentially adverse effects on indigenous people caused by Bank-assisted 
                                                 
43 Carey & Wiessner, supra note 2. 
44 In 2001, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights appointed Rudolfo Stavenhagen from Mexico 
as the first Special Rapporteur.  See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Res/2001/57, available at 
http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/sdpage_e.aspx?m=73&t=11. 
45 See supra note 3. 
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activities.”46  OD 4.20’s strategy statement promotes the adoption of customary 
law and the informed participation of native peoples in projects.  It supports the 
“incorporation of indigenous knowledge into project approaches” and the 
integration of “local patterns of social organization, religious beliefs, and resource 
use” in the Bank’s Indigenous Peoples Development Plans.47  In 2005, the Bank 
approved a revised operational policy and bank procedure on indigenous peoples 
(OP/BP 4.10), which includes similar provisions.  Other development banks have 
approved comparable guidelines to address indigenous issues and protect 
customary norms when designing development projects.48  The development 
banks’ operational policies demonstrate the power of local communities to 
influence international law, which then shapes the laws of borrower countries.49   
 
 In addition to international organizations, there are state courts and 
legislative bodies that have not only recognized but have also incorporated 
indigenous norms into domestic policy.  One of the most notable developments is 
the Canadian Supreme Court’s acceptance of oral history as an admissible form of 
legal evidence to prove aboriginal land title.  In the 1997 case of Delgamuukw v. 
British Columbia, the Court expanded the rules of aboriginal title to land to 
include evidence of the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en peoples’ spiritual connection 
and attachment to their territory, including oral history.50  It held: 
 
A court should approach the rules of evidence, and interpret the evidence 
that exists, with a consciousness of the special nature of aboriginal claims, 
and of the evidentiary difficulties in proving a right which originates in 
times where there were no written records of the practices, customs, and 
traditions engaged in.  The courts must not undervalue the evidence 
                                                 
46 World Bank, The World Bank Operational Manual, Operational Directive 4.20 (Sept. 1991) 
(Indigenous Peoples).  
47 Id. at paras. 8, 14. 
48 See Inter-American Development Bank, Strategy for Indigenous Development (2006), available 
at http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=691275; Asian Development Bank, 
Policy on Indigenous Peoples (1998), available at 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/Indigenous_Peoples/ADB-1998-Policy-on-IP.pdf.   
49 See generally, Galit A. Sarfaty, Note, The World Bank and the Internalization of Indigenous 
Rights Norms, 114 YALE L.J. 1791 (2005). 
50 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010.  This case was brought in the early 
1980s by the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en peoples, who sought to pressure the government of 
British Columbia to acknowledge aboriginal title and enter into land claims negotiations.  The 
most significant evidence of a spiritual connection between the two groups and their territory was 
a feast hall where the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en peoples orally pass down stories and songs that 
tie them to their land.  The Supreme Court ruled against the trial judge’s refusal to recognize the 
indigenous peoples’ oral history as permissible evidence and ordered that a new trial be convened 
that gave weight to their oral histories as evidence. 
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presented by aboriginal claimants simply because that evidence does not 
conform precisely with the evidentiary standards that would be applied in, 
for example, a private law torts case. . . .  Notwithstanding the challenges 
created by the use of oral histories as proof of historical facts, the laws of 
evidence must be adapted in order that this type of evidence can be 
accommodated and placed on an equal footing with the types of historical 
evidence that courts are familiar with.51   
 
This decision recognizes that the traditional laws of evidence in Canadian courts 
unfairly discriminated against indigenous peoples and, therefore, should be 
expanded in future trials to include oral testimony.   
 
In Norway, the native Sami people, who have presided over the Sami 
Council since 1956, have influenced court procedures and federal law through 
their political participation.  As a result of the Sami’s effective lobbying, 
Norwegian courts are now obliged to use the Sami language in prosecution and 
when taking evidence.52  Moreover, Sami may be used as a language of 
administration in the six municipalities with the largest concentration of Sami 
people.53   
 
 Besides revising court procedures to accommodate indigenous norms, 
many countries are also passing legislation that explicitly recognizes and gives 
rights to native peoples and incorporates their customary law.  Under pressure 
from civil society movements, several Latin American countries, such as 
Colombia and Mexico, have recently voted to officially recognize indigenous 
peoples within their constitutions.54  The new constitution in Bolivia, adopted in 
1994, treats indigenous communities as legal entities and gives them the power to 
exercise administrative functions and alternative dispute resolution procedures in 
accordance with their customs.55  Traditional indigenous councils in Colombia are 
                                                 
51 Id. at paras. 80, 87. 
52 MANUELA TOMEI & LEE SWEPSTON, INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL PEOPLES: A GUIDE TO ILO 
CONVENTION NO. 169 (1996), Box No. 8  
53 Id. 
54 Colombia’s new constitution, adopted in 1991, recognizes and protects the ethnic and cultural 
diversity of the Colombian nation. See Constitución Política de la República de Colombia, as 
amended, Título I, Artículo 7, 27 de Julio de 2005 (Colom.).  A 1991 amendment to the Mexican 
constitution states that Mexico has a multicultural composition based originally on its indigenous 
peoples. See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Const.], as amended, Título 
Primero, Capítulo 1, Artículo 2, Diario Oficial de la Federación [D.O.], 27 de Septiembre de 2004 
(Mex.).  
55 See Constitución Política de la República de Bolívia, as amended, Título Tercero, Artículo 171, 
6 de Julio de 2005 (Bol.).  
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given similar power under the country’s constitution.  They have full judicial 
authority in accordance with their customary laws, as long as their practices are 
not contrary to national legislation.56   
 
European countries have also recognized indigenous rights and, in one 
case, borrowed from the local norms of indigenous peoples when drafting national 
laws.  As an expression of united European support for indigenous concerns, the 
European Parliament in 1994 adopted a resolution on “Measures Required 
Internationally to Provide Effective Protection for Indigenous Peoples.”57  The 
resolution affirms the right of native peoples “to determine their own destiny by 
choosing their institutions, their political status, and that of their territory.”58 
Some European countries have also issued policies on indigenous rights to guide 
aid to developing countries.59  For instance, Switzerland’s policy requires 
consultation with indigenous organizations in the planning, implementation, and 
evaluation of projects and the design of corrective measures against potential 
harmful impacts.60  The policy commits Switzerland to engage in political 
dialogue with partner countries towards strengthening indigenous peoples’ 
political participation and protecting their rights within local legal systems.61  
Denmark has gone so far as to draw upon the customary law of the Greenlandic 
Inuit when writing its Greenland Criminal Code.  The law measures sanctions not 
by the gravity of the crime but by the individual offender’s personal 
background.62  It is based on Inuit legal tradition, which aims to eliminate conflict 
and restore peace rather than to seek punishment or justice.63  The adoption of 
these policies suggests the growing influence of the indigenous rights movement 
                                                 
56 See Constitución Política de la República de Colombia, as amended, Capítulo V, Artículo 246, 
27 de Julio de 2005 (Colom.).  
57 Resolution on Action Required Internationally to Provide Effective Protection for Indigenous 
Peoples, EUR. PARL. DOC. (PV 58) 2 (1994). 
58 Id. at 3, para. 2.  
59 See SWISS AGENCY FOR DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION, SWISS ACTION FOR INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES 32 (1998) (referencing Netherlands’s Policy on Indigenous Peoples, 1993; the Danish 
Strategy for Support to Indigenous Peoples, 1994; Guidance on Ethnicity, Ethnic Minorities and 
Indigenous Peoples, United Kingdom, 1995; Policy for Indigenous Peoples in Latin America, 
Germany, 1996; and Strategy for Cooperation with Indigenous Peoples, Spain, 1997).  
60 Id. at 18. 
61 Id. at 21.  In accordance with this policy, Switzerland supported the creation of human rights 
defense centers in Bolivia, which pay special attention to the rights of indigenous peoples in the 
administration of justice.  Id. 
62 See VERNER GOLDSCHMIDT, Introduction to THE GREENLAND CRIMINAL CODE 3 (Leonard 
Kaplan, Michael Merrit & Norval Morris eds., Fred B. Rothman & Co.) (1970). 
63 Elaine Schechter, The Greenland Criminal Code and the Limits to Legal Pluralism, 7 
ÉTUDES/INUIT/STUDIES 79, 79 (1983) (quoted in ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER 
SOCIAL JUSTICE COMMISSIONER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, THIRD 
REPORT 23 (1995)). 
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in lobbying for recognition and even incorporation of customary norms and 
cultural practices. 
 
2. Indigenous Peoples and their Negotiation of Local Law 
 
In the process of lobbying for changes in domestic and international 
policy, indigenous communities are adopting normative commitments from other 
legal orders (i.e., state and international law) and reevaluating their own 
conceptions of law and justice.  Political mobilization by indigenous groups 
contains at least three interrelated components: (i) an appeal to international 
human rights norms to justify the protection of their rights; (ii) an attempt to 
interpret state law and enforce treaty obligations in a light favorable to the 
maintenance of their autonomy; and (iii) an effort to assert the legitimacy of local 
indigenous law and cultural norms in both domestic and international legal 
systems.  While advocating for the recognition of their customary practices, they 
are negotiating the meaning and application of their local laws.  As they frame 
and re-frame their claims for national and international audiences, groups find 
themselves looking within and engaging in an intra-group dialogue over the 
meaning of their cultural norms. 
 
As a collectivity, rather than simply a group of individuals, an indigenous 
group acts as an insular interpretive community, or in the terminology of Robert 
Cover, a nomos—a normative universe held together by interpretive 
commitments.64  Such communities “establish their own meanings for 
constitutional principles through their constant struggle to define and maintain the 
independence and authority of their nomos.”65  Indigenous peoples are engaged in 
constant campaigns for their political, cultural, and economic sovereignty.  They 
are fighting for decision-making authority over such issues as the structure of 
their government, their language of administration, and their strategy for 
economic development.   
 
The “jurisgenerative” process, whereby legal meaning is created within a 
community, is dialectical between those inside and outside the community and 
among community members themselves.66  Cover notes that freedom of 
association within an interpretive community “implies a degree of norm-
generating autonomy,” which he defines as “a liberty and capacity to create and 
                                                 
64 Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. 
L. REV. 4 (1983). 
65 Id. at 25. 
66 Id. at 15. 
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interpret law—minimally, to interpret the terms of the association’s own being.”67  
As indigenous groups translate the language of rights into their own local legal 
conceptions, non-indigenous (state and international) norms become what 
Clifford Geertz describes as “local knowledge” and customary norms are 
reinterpreted accordingly.68  This has been the experience of the Pimicikamak 
Cree Nation when redesigning its local government and laws pursuant to its right 
to self-determination. Building on their recent political mobilization in the 
international human rights community, the Cree are engaging in legal mediation 
among local, state, and international norms. 
 
II.  THE PIMICIKAMAK CREE NATION 
 
 Before engaging in legal mediation, local communities like indigenous 
peoples have often been exposed to international norms through their global 
campaigns for human rights. This Part offers an ethnographic narrative of the 
diffusion of international norms in one indigenous community, the Pimicikamak 
Cree Nation of Cross Lake, Manitoba.  Since suffering from the destructive 
effects of a state-funded hydroelectric dam constructed in the 1970s, the Cree 
have demanded compensation from the Canadian government, as promised under 
the Northern Flood Agreement (NFA).69  Over the past two decades, the socio-
economic situation of the Cree has been dismal—by 1998, they were suffering 
from about 85% unemployment,70 high alcoholism, one of the highest crime rates 
in Manitoba, and a suicide rate ten times the general rate for native people in 
Canada and 23 times the national average.71  Although the Cree were enduring 
poverty conditions and mental health problems, they nevertheless remained 
hopeful that change was possible.   
 
Rather than waiting indeterminately for external assistance, the Cree 
decided in 1998 to pursue an international campaign against the Canadian 
government as a means of rebuilding their community.  Their activism was 
motivated by “an absence of validation, a lack of willingness on the part of 
governments to seriously acknowledge social suffering and a collective 
                                                 
67 Id. at 32. 
68 Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge:  Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, in LOCAL 
KNOWLEDGE:  FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 167-235 (1983). 
69 See infra Part II.A.1. 
70 AITCHISON ET AL., REPORT OF THE INTERCHURCH INQUIRY INTO NORTHERN HYDRO 
DEVELOPMENT (2001).  
71 Grand Council of the Crees, Reciting the Symptoms, Ignoring the Cause: The Systematic 
Dispossession of Aboriginal Peoples in Canada, Submission to the U.N. Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (Nov. 16, 1998), http://www.gcc.ca/archive/article.php?id=67 (citing 
data communicated verbally by anthropologist Ronald Niezen). 
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experience of injustice.”72  In cooperation with other indigenous and 
environmental organizations, the Cree invoked international human rights 
discourse as they asserted their right to self-determination.  In this case study, I 
describe the historical circumstances that form the background of the Cree’s 
human rights campaign.  I then describe the Cree’s appeals to international law 
and their participation in the transnational advocacy network for indigenous 
rights.  Finally, I discuss the international right to self-determination that serves as 
the basis for their assertion of political autonomy.  In Part III, I will analyze their 
unique model of self-government that reconciles local, state, and international 
law.  
 
A.  Historical Background 
 
The Pimicikamak Cree’s reservation is located 520 air kilometers north of 
Winnipeg along the shore of the Nelson River, where it enters Cross Lake. The 
total registered population is 6,625 (including 4,701 on-reserve),73 with more than 
50 percent of the population under the age of 20.74  Language is the basis of Cree 
culture and is spoken by the majority of residents in everyday conversation.  Not 
only is Cree instruction incorporated into the on-reserve schools, but public 
meetings, political debates, local entertainment, and radio broadcasts are also 
conducted in Cree.75 
 
 Until the 1970s, Cree residents subsisted off the land in relative isolation 
from the rest of Manitoba.  Leading a self-sufficient, nomadic way of life, they 
developed a social structure that was highly influenced by their natural resource-
based economy.  Their basic governing process was based on consultation and 
consensus, which was the customary decision-making method among Cree 
hunters working in trapline areas.76  The Cree’s relative isolation gradually began 
                                                 
72 RONALD NIEZEN, THE ORIGINS OF INDIGENISM: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY 
66-67 (2003). 
73 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, First Nations Community Profiles (2007), available at 
http://pse2-esd2.ainc-inac.gc.ca/FNProfiles/FNProfiles_home.htm.  On-reserve means living on 
the reservation. 
74 Jason Miller, Statement to the Interchurch Inquiry on Northern Hydro Development (June 22, 
1999) (on file with the Harvard International Law Journal).   
75 Operating since 1979, the local television station broadcasts talk shows and public service 
announcements in the Cree language as well. 
76 Hunters had to leave areas fallow in order to allow the animals to replenish themselves.  As they 
moved their families from one trapline to another, the hunters needed to coordinate their activities 
with other families.  Cooperation and consultation within the village were necessary for survival.  
See RONALD NIEZEN, DEFENDING THE LAND 16-17, 62 (1998). 
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to decline, as increasing accessibility to the outside through winter roads led to 
greater contact with non-Cree society.   
 
 In the 1970s, an unexpected event suddenly altered the Cree’s lifestyle 
and transformed their community: the construction of the Churchill-Nelson River 
hydroelectric dam project.  The three parties responsible for the dam were the 
Canadian government, the Manitoba government, and Manitoba Hydro, an 
electric utility corporation headquartered in Winnipeg.  Construction on the 
project commenced without the completion of environmental studies and, most 
notably, without prior consultation with or approval from the five affected native 
communities.77  The Canadian government later acknowledged these failures in 
the 1992 Report of the Auditor General of Canada and the 1996 Final Report of 
the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples.78  Due to the lack of an 
environmental impact review, the project unexpectedly flooded 20 percent of the 
five communities’ reserve land-base, causing permanent disruptions to the 
ecosystem and their livelihoods.79 
 
 The flooding of Cross Lake in 1974 and the completion of the dam a year 
later caused massive ecological destruction that severely altered the subsistence 
economy and culture of the Pimicikamak Cree Nation.80  The erosion of the 
                                                 
77 The five affected native communities were the Cree Nations of Cross Lake, Split Lake, Norway 
House, York Landing, and Nelson House.   
78 The 1992 Report states, “We found no evidence that a comprehensive environmental impact 
assessment had ever been performed.  We believe that such an assessment is essential for NFA 
implementation. . . ”  OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL OF CANADA, REPORT OF THE AUDITOR 
GENERAL OF CANADA § 15.118, 377 (1992), available at http://www.oag-
bvg.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/ch9215e.html#0.2.L39QK2.WYGVQP1.  The 1996 Final Report 
states, “Although the [Churchill River Diversion] project directly affected the lands and livelihood 
of five treaty communities, . . . they were not consulted, nor did they give their approval for the 
undertaking.”  2 ROYAL COMM’N ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION 
ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES 516 (1996).   
79 Patricia M. Larcombe Cobb, The Northern Flood Agreement: Implementation of Land, 
Resource, and Environmental Regimes in a Treaty Area (A Report Prepared for the Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples Land, Resource and Environmental Regimes Project, Oct. 
1995), at Section 3.5.2.  The flooding was unexpected given that “the Premier repeatedly stated 
that the project would not result in any reserve flooding.”  Id.  The federal government misled the 
Cree regarding the expected effects of the project.  The “Lime Green Brochure” (information 
bulletin) distributed by the Canadian government in 1975 stated that there were no unexpected 
long term effects and that it was “hoped that conditions [would] be such that it [would] be 
unnecessary to pay compensation to anyone” (quoted in Report of the Interchurch Inquiry into 
Northern Hydro Development, supra note 70, at 11).  
80 As a result of these physical and biological changes, there has been “a systemic degradation of 
the local economy.”  Id. at Section 2.5.3.  For a detailed list of the adverse effects of the project, 
see the 1992 Report of the Auditor General of Canada (372).   
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shorelines, unnatural fluctuations in water levels, and reversal of seasonal water 
flows rendered numerous traditional Cree hunting routes fatally treacherous.  The 
sedimentation in the water caused the release of methyl-mercury and the 
contamination of fish, an integral part of the Cree subsistence diet.81  As a result 
of elevated mercury levels, as well as the destruction of spawning grounds and 
changes in water flows, commercial fishing was no longer a viable industry.82  
Without the option of continuing to live off the land, the majority of Cree became 
welfare recipients and had to learn new skills to compete in the growing wage 
economy.83  By undermining the traditional hunting, trapping, and fishing way of 
life, the hydroelectric project attacked Cree cultural values as well as the physical 
and psychological health of the community.   
 
1.  The Northern Flood Agreement (NFA) in the Context of 
Canadian-Indigenous Policies 
 
In the wake of the Churchill-Nelson River hydroelectric project, five Cree 
First Nations, including the Pimicikamak Cree Nation of Cross Lake, formed the 
Northern Flood Committee in 1974 and negotiated the Northern Flood Agreement 
(NFA) with Manitoba Hydro and the governments of Canada and Manitoba (the 
three “Crown parties”).84  The comprehensive NFA, a legally binding document, 
was signed on December 16, 1977.85  It promises four acres of replacement land 
for each acre flooded, protection of wildlife resources and harvesting activities, 
compensation for injury or loss of life on hazardous waterways, funding for social 
and economic development, and remedial measures to secure eroding shorelines, 
remove debris, and restore burial sites.86  It also guarantees the protection of all 
rights described in Treaty Number Five of 1875.87  Finally, the NFA promises to 
support the ongoing viability of the communities “for the lifetime of the project” 
(Art. 25) and to ensure “the eradication of mass unemployment and mass poverty” 
                                                 
81 Luke Hertlein, Lake Winnipeg Regulation Churchill-Nelson River Diversion Project in the 
Crees of Northern Manitoba Canada 8 (World Comm’n on Dams, Thematic Review 1.2: Dams 
Indigenous People and Vulnerable Minorities, 1999).   
82 Id. 
83 Ronald Niezen, Treaty Violations and the Hydro-Payment Rebellion of Cross Lake, Manitoba, 
23 CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q. 18, 19 (1999). 
84 Cobb, supra note 79, at Section 3.1. 
85 Id. at Section 3.9. 
86 Id. at Sections 3.9, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 5.4, and 5.5.3. 
87 Treaty 5 between Her Majesty the Queen and the Saulteaux and Swampy Cree Tribes of 
Indians, Can.-Salteaux and Swampy Cree Tribes of Indians, 1875, available at http://www.ainc-
inac.gc.ca/pr/trts/trty5_e.html.  In exchange for giving up their rights to huge tracts of land in 
northern Manitoba, the treaty provides reserve lands of not more than 160 acres per family of five, 
an annual payment of $5 for each band member, and legal protection of the tribes’ water, fishing, 
trapping, and hunting rights. 
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(Schedule “E”).  The NFA does not represent a one-time legal settlement, but a 
long-term socio-economic relationship of trust between the indigenous 
communities and the Crown parties.  In order to understand where the NFA fits 
within the larger context of Canada’s treatment of its native people, it is important 
to review the Canadian policies leading up to and following its adoption. 
 
 The NFA is part of a history of Canadian-indigenous relations that began 
with the Indian Act of 1876.  Administered by the federal Department of Indian 
Affairs, the Indian Act gives the Canadian government far-reaching control over 
the affairs of native people––e.g., tribal government structure, reservation lands 
and resources, Indian status, taxation, health, and education.  It represents a 
fiduciary obligation on the Canadian government to protect Indian lands from 
unauthorized use or takings.  Under the Indian Act, a Chief and Council replaced 
traditional tribal governments as agents of the Canadian government.  In its 
provisions for the Chief and Council tribal government system, the act establishes 
regulations for elections and political administration, giving tribes limited power 
under federal supervision.  Its basic agenda of assimilation and its attitude of 
paternalism have been partially mitigated with revisions in 1951 that reversed the 
ban on the potlatch and sun dance traditional ceremonies and ended the 
prohibition against native people’s entry into public bars.  A 1995 amendment to 
the Indian Act removed a gender discriminatory regulation that did not recognize 
native women who married non-native men as “status Indians” deserving of 
federal benefits.88 
 
 In 1982, the government drafted the Canadian Constitution, which 
recognizes and affirms existing aboriginal and treaty rights.89  It invited 
indigenous leaders to preparatory talks regarding the Constitution and consulted 
with them on other policy reports, including the Report of the Special Committee 
on Indian Self-Government (the Penner Report) of 1983.  The Penner Report calls 
“for a renewed federal-Indian relationship . . . [which] recognize[s] that Indian 
First Nations constitute a distinct order of government in Canada.”90  It outlines a 
process of devolving more management responsibility to native communities and 
                                                 
88 Status Indians are those who are registered with the federal government as Indians according to 
the terms of the Indian Act.  Before the 1995 amendment, the Indian Act only removed Indian 
status from Indian women who married non-Indians and their children.  In the reverse situation, 
when Indian men married non-Indian women, the Indian men and their children could still hold 
Indian status. 
89 Constitution Act, 1982, 35, Part I, ch. 11 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 44 (Appendix 
1985).   
90 House of Commons, Special Committee on Indian Self-Government, Indian Self-Government in 
Canada: Report of the Special Committee 32 (1983). 
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full legislative power to Indian governments in such areas as social and economic 
development, land and resource use, and law enforcement.   
 
Over the last two decades, Canadian policy statements have supported the 
right of indigenous peoples to political autonomy.  In August 1995, the 
government approved a policy for negotiating self-government agreements 
individually adapted for different communities.91  Its recognition that no single 
form of government works for all communities is a marked departure from the 
Indian Act approach.  A number of communities, including the Pimicikamak Cree 
Nation, have taken advantage of this new policy to design a government that 
draws upon customary law.  I will outline the details of this government in Part 
III. 
 
           2.  Failure to Implement the NFA 
 
In the decades since the the NFA’s ratification, the Crown parties have 
failed to implement its core provisions.92  According to the Report of the 
Interchurch Inquiry into Northern Hydro Development, “much of the history of 
NFA implementation is characterized largely by avoidance of responsibility on 
the part of the Crown parties.”93  A research report prepared for the Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples concludes: 
 
The three parties did not intend, and have never intended to cooperate 
energetically in measures designed and determined to be effective in 
confronting the adverse impacts of the project.  They have instead used 
every legal device to limit their individual liabilities under the Agreement.  
The sixteen year history of the NFA is largely a record of the deployment 
of those devices . . . . To the communities [the history of the NFA] is a 
manifestation of bad faith by both levels of government.  It has done little 
to address the impacts which continue to confront the communities.94  
 
By 1999, the Cree had received negligible compensation in the 23 years since 
signing the NFA.95  For example, the federal government had granted only 60 of 
                                                 
91 Government of Canada, Inherent Right of Self-Government Policy (1995) 
92 The 1996 Report states, “[The NFA’s] history has been marked by little or no action in 
implementation of NFA obligations and a long, drawn out (and continuing) process of arbitration 
to force governments to implement their obligations.”  2 ROYAL COMM’N ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, 
REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES 517 (1996).   
93 AITCHINSON ET AL., supra note 70, at 23.  
94 Cobb, supra note 79, at Section 7.1. 
95 In March 1999, Warren Allmand, the federal Minister of Indian Affairs who negotiated the NFA 
in 1977, stated to a parliamentary committee: “Last year, much to my dismay, I discovered that the 
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the 14,000 hectares of promised replacement lands and Manitoba Hydro had not 
created the jobs that it had promised under the NFA.96  
 
 Beginning in 1992, the Crown parties offered to replace the NFA with 
one-time cash buy-out settlements, called Comprehensive Implementation 
Agreements (CIAs), with the five affected native communities.97  Rather than 
implement the provisions of the earlier agreement, the CIAs would have 
terminated many of the Crown parties’ NFA treaty and fiduciary obligations and 
prevented signatory tribes from pursuing any future lawsuits by limiting the 
parties’ ongoing liabilities under the NFA (with the exception of injuries, deaths, 
and unforeseen impacts).98  Given that the Canadian government did not conduct 
a comprehensive damage assessment, there was no assurance that the lump sum 
payments would fairly compensate for long-term NFA implementation costs.  The 
communities were forced into a seemingly lose-lose situation––sign the CIA and 
accept the extinguishment of treaty rights or continue to live in severe poverty, 
unsure of whether the NFA would ever be implemented.   
 
Amid heated intra-tribal disputes, all the signatory indigenous nations 
accepted the CIAs except the Pimicikamak Cree of Cross Lake.99  As the largest 
and poorest of the five affected Cree communities, the Pimicikamak Cree Nation 
                                                                                                                                     
great majority of the Northern Flood Agreement was never implemented.  After 21 years, virtually 
nothing had been done.”  Allmand also suspected that at some point, governments “came to the 
conclusion that they didn’t like the Northern Flood Agreement, that maybe it had too many 
obligations, it was too rich and they decided they would try to get something better in its place––
[the Comprehensive Implementation Agreements].”  Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs 
and Northern Development, House of Commons (Mar. 9, 1999) (statement of Warren Allmand, 
former federal Minister of Indian Affairs), available at 
http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/committee/361/aand/evidence/ev1039313/aandev52-e.htm. 
96 DEP’T OF INDIAN AFFAIRS AND N. DEV., REPORT OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL OF CANADA, art. 
15. 139 (1992), http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/ch9215e.html; AITCHINSON ET 
AL., supra note 70, at 18.  
97 The United States similarly tried to compensate American Indian tribes with monetary payments 
in the 1946 Indian Claims Commission Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 70-70w (1976) (repealed 1978).  This 
policy was intended to overcome procedural and financial obstacles in the way of Indian tribes 
seeking restitution for grievances against the United States.  In repaying tribes for historical 
abuses, the Indian Claims Commission also attempted to extinguish long-standing Indian rights.   
98 There were earlier attempts, beginning in 1985, to extinguish the NFA by offering cash 
settlements, but they were rejected.  See NIEZEN, supra note 72, at 68.   
99 However, the federally-administered process by which the agreements were ratified casts 
serious doubt on the credibility and legitimacy of the settlement.  In Norway House, for instance, 
although an initial referendum on the CIA failed, the government administered a repeat vote only 
two months later.  It relaxed the criteria for approval and promised monetary payments to each 
community member who voted for the settlement deal, which was finally approved.  See 
AITCHINSON ET AL., supra note 70, at 66. 
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refused to abandon claims to the NFA obligations that it had awaited for over 
twenty years.  Many community members viewed the CIA as a “sell-out” with no 
mechanism for reaching the lasting self-sufficiency promised under the NFA.100  
The Pimicikamak Cree’s decision was influenced by the factionalization of 
communities like the Norway House Cree Nation, which ultimately ratified the 
CIA in 1997.  A prominent minority of dissidents in Norway House questioned 
the legitimacy of the federally-administered process, which was based on a local 
referendum where the Canadian government promised to pay about $1,000 to 
each community member who voted for the settlement deal.101  A few years after 
Norway House signed the CIA, former Chief Allan Ross attributed “personal 
greed” as the reason why residents voted for the agreement.102  He admitted that 
he didn’t see much benefit in signing the agreement for Norway House because 
many of their rights under the NFA have been now extinguished and they no 
longer have the option of appealing to the Canadian government.103 
 
Since their decision to reject the CIA in late 1997, the Pimicikamak Cree 
intensified their campaign for NFA implementation and extended it 
internationally.  They promised to “take all legitimate actions, consistent with 
[their] commitment to non-violence and [their] treaties of peace with Canada, to 
defend [their] human rights.”104  The devastating social, environmental, and 
economic damages deriving from the hydroelectric project and the non-
implementation of the NFA inspired a wave of political and cultural awareness 
within the community.  Political mobilization prompted many residents to 
advocate for a return to their customary practices.  According to Chief John 
Miswagon, the Cree decided to base their new government on traditions, which 
“are integral to our identity as a people and our relationship to the land.”105  Their 
recent self-government initiative and the preservation of their cultural norms 
                                                 
100 Interview with Gerald Frogg, Resident of the Pimicikamak Cree Nation, in Cross Lake, 
Manitoba (July 25, 1999). 
101 See AITCHINSON ET AL., supra note 70, at 66.  There were also allegations of “arbitrary changes 
to locations and hours of polling stations, intimidation of voters, insufficient and inaccurate 
communication about the difference between the NFA and the MIA [Master Implementation 
Agreement, which is another name for the CIA], . . . withholding the per capita payments to MIA 
opponents, and arrests of Band members legitimately seeking to communicate their opinions.”  Id. 
102 Former Norway House Cree Chief Allan Ross, Statement to the Interchurch Inquiry into 
Northern Hydro Development, Band Hall, Cross Lake (June 21, 1999) (on file with Harvard 
International Law Journal).  
103 Id. 
104 Chief Roland Robinson, Broken Promises Litter Northern Hydro Treaty, WINNIPEG FREE 
PRESS , July 14, 1998, at A11. 
105 A Government of Our Own, Speech by Chief John Miswagon to the Fronteir Center for Public 
Policy (April 21, 2005), available at 
http://www.fcpp.org/main/publication_detail.php?PubID=1043 
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indicate that they have not given up their fight for social justice.  Twenty-three 
years after the signing of the NFA, the Cree have united under a new rallying cry: 
“Enough is enough!”106 
 
B.  Transnational Political Mobilization   
 
Our voice will be heard in homes, in schools, in churches, in courts, in the 
legislature, in Parliament, in export markets, in bond-rating agencies, in 
international financial circles, in human rights forums, in places you have 
not yet dreamed of. . . .  [O]ur voice will not be silenced.  It is high time 
that public and international attention should focus on the behavior of 
federal and provincial governments towards us over the last three decades.  
And yes, we hope that those whose causes include human rights, 
aboriginal rights, the environment, ethical investment, religion, and 
international law will join us. 
 
-- Former Pimicikamak Cree Chief Roland 
Robinson107 
 
Following their rejection of the CIA in October 1997, the Cree felt that it was 
time to take action against the Canadian government’s failure to implement the 
NFA.  During this period, there was “a confused reawakening in which anger and 
sorrow over years of unatoned grievance mingled uncomfortably with a sense of 
empowerment.”108  For the first time, the Cree invoked their “inherent 
jurisdiction” (as opposed to the jurisdiction provided in the Indian Act) to elect a 
new Chief, who reinvigorated their battle for NFA implementation and their right 
to self-government.109  Inherent jurisdiction refers to the power of a people to 
govern itself as it formerly did, based upon its traditions, customs, and inherent 
rights as a nation.  This form of government stands in contrast to a system of laws 
deriving from treaties or a delegation of authority by the Canadian government.   
 
Feeling betrayed by the Crown parties’ attempts to buy out their NFA 
promises, the Cree organized a political campaign focused on appeals to 
international human rights law, particularly their right to self-determination.  They 
                                                 
106 Former Cross Lake Cree Chief Roland Robinson, Statement to the Interchurch Inquiry into 
Northern Hydro Development, Band Hall, Cross Lake (June 25, 1999).  
107 Robinson, supra note 104. 
108 Niezen, supra note 83, at 21.   
109 See NIEZEN, supra note 72, at 170-71 (“The exercise of inherent legal authority is  . . . not only 
an assertion of self-determination but also part of a process of reconstituting sovereignty, of 
indigenous nation building.”). 
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adopted a strategy of public visibility by collaborating with national and 
international human rights organizations and using the media to broadcast their 
grievances.  They called this tactic: a “politics of embarrassment.”110  In a 
working paper entitled A New Relationship,111 the Cree proclaim that “for [their] 
purposes, the court of public opinion tends to work faster, cheaper, and better.  
Expressed in Cree terms, [the Pimicikamak Cree’s] strategy is to rely upon the 
Law of Consequences, . . . [in which] visibility is seen as a more effective 
approach to accountability than alternatives such as arbitration or court 
actions.”112   
 
 While asserting the right to self-determination of peoples under 
international law, the Cree have campaigned internationally to protest injustices 
by the Canadian government and the state-sponsored Manitoba Hydro 
corporation.113  They have spoken to church groups and colleges throughout 
Winnipeg to inform Manitoba Hydro customers of the social costs of their electric 
power.114  Their public relations drive has extended to the Midwestern United 
States, including Minnesota, whose residents purchase 90 percent of Manitoba 
Hydro’s energy exports.115  Finally, it has even reached Geneva, Switzerland, 
where the Cree have lobbied the U.N. for the protection of their rights under the 
International Human Rights Covenants.116  Through their involvement at the 
U.N., the Cree have publicized Canada’s violations of their rights, as 
demonstrated by its failure to implement the NFA, its underfunding of the tribe 
                                                 
110 The Pimicikamak Cree’s use of the “politics of embarrassment” was modeled after the 
campaign against hydroelectric development by the James Bay Cree of Quebec.  Beginning in the 
early 1990s, the James Bay Cree successfully campaigned against the construction of the Great 
Whale hydroelectric project.  Their international lobbying efforts aimed to bring “to the attention 
of a largely sympathetic audience of voting constituents, the injustice, bigotry, and impact of the 
government’s negligence on the living conditions in native communities.”  Niezen, supra note 83, 
at 5.  
111 Pimicikamak Cree Nation, A New Relationship (1999) (on file with Harvard International Law 
Journal).  This working paper, drafted in January 1999, is a 32-page booklet that proposes a new 
relationship between the Cree and the Crown parties.  Based on community discussions within 
circle groups and general assemblies, the paper outlines principles and structures for the 
implementation of the NFA in a manner that respects Cree laws, traditions, and rights. 
112 Id. at 2. 
113 See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, 
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, Annex, art. 1, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 
(Dec. 16, 1966). 
114 Will Braun, Manitoba Aboriginal Rights Coalition Information Sheet, “Cross-Border Kilowats, 
Indians, and Human Rights” (Sept. 10, 1999), available at 
http://www.alphacdc.com/treaty/pimicikamak.html. 
115 NIEZEN, supra note 72, at 181. 
116 Id. 
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over the last decade, and its depriving of the Cree’s own means of subsistence.  
Their transnational campaign reflects the political mobilization of indigenous 
groups worldwide as they pressure states to comply with international norms. 
 
           1.  Appeals to the United Nations 
 
While traveling across Manitoba and the United States to gather support 
for their campaign, the Cree decided to further broaden their audience by 
appealing to the U.N.  They first became involved with the U.N. through their 
affiliation with the Grand Council of the Crees, a political body that represents 
about 14,000 Cree in Northern Quebec.117  The Grand Council, which has had 
consultative status with the U.N. Economic and Social Council since the 1980s, 
has educated the Pimicikamak Cree on the international human rights system and 
included information about their situation as part of its submissions to U.N. 
bodies.  For example, the Grand Council’s November 1998 report to the U.N. 
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which monitors countries’ 
compliance with the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights, described the unfulfilled NFA promises, low per capita government 
expenditures, and high suicide rate at the Pimicikamak Cree Nation.118  During 
the December 1998 meeting of the U.N. Committee, then Pimicikamak Cree 
Chief Roland Robinson joined Grand Council representatives, the Chief of the 
Assembly of First Nations, and four other Manitoba Chiefs to address the third-
world social conditions existing on Canadian reservations.   
 
The observations published at the conclusion of the U.N. meeting 
reproached Canada for its treatment of its indigenous people.  The Committee 
concluded that “policies which violate aboriginal treaty obligations and 
extinguishment, conversion, or giving up of aboriginal rights” are a human rights 
concern emerging out of the International Bill of Human Rights.119  Thus, 
                                                 
117 See Grand Council of the Crees (Eeyou Istchee): About the GCC, 
http://www.gcc.ca/gcc/whogcc.htm (last visited March 16, 2007).   
118 Grand Council of the Cree, Reciting the Symptoms, Ignoring the Cause: The Systematic 
Dispossession of Aboriginal People in Canada, Submission to the U.N. Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (Nov. 16, 1998), http://www.gcc.ca/archive/article.php?id=67.   
119 Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN 
CESCR, 1998, UN Doc. E/C.12/1Add.31, paragraph 18.  The International Bill of Human Rights 
consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948); the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. 
Doc. A/6316 (1966); and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its two 
Optional Protocols, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp.  (No.16) at 52, U.N. Doc 
A/6316 (1966).  The Canadian government signed and ratified the international human rights 
covenants in 1975, one year before signing the NFA. 
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Canada’s failure to honor the Northern Flood Agreement would be considered a 
breach of its U.N. treaty obligations.  The Committee’s comments on Canada’s 
violation of indigenous rights received worldwide attention as “one of the most 
scathing critiques of an affluent country that’s ever been released by a U.N. 
human rights body.”120 
 
Only four months after the release of the Committee on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights’ observations, another U.N. committee, the Human Rights 
Committee on Civil and Political Rights, declared that “the situation of the 
aboriginal peoples remains the most pressing human rights issue facing 
Canadians.”121  As the U.N. body responsible for monitoring the implementation 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Human Rights 
Committee emphasized the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination and 
urged Canada to implement the recommendations of the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples’ 1996 study.  The Committee’s April 1999 report was largely 
in response to a submission by the Grand Council of the Crees that included 
testimony from the Pimicikamak Cree Nation.   
 
 The health care crisis at the Pimicikamak Cree Nation, including the high 
suicide rate and the shortage of nurses, was the subject of further international 
lobbying at the U.N. by the Cree.122  After repeatedly issuing complaints to the 
provincial and federal governments, the Cree contacted Dr. Arthur Kleinman, 
then chairman of Harvard University’s School of Social Medicine, for an expert 
opinion on the inadequate health care services in the community.  Citing Dr. 
Kleinman’s assessment of the “crisis level” situation at their reservation, the Cree 
wrote letters to the World Health Organization (WHO) and the U.N. Committee 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.  A Cree representative also testified at 
a WHO conference during the fall of 1999.123  He informed the panel that the 
Pimicikamak Cree Nation had been forced into a state of emergency that violates 
                                                 
120 Helen Branswell, U.N. Report Card Flunks Canada for Social Injustice, THE CANADIAN PRESS, 
Dec. 4, 1998, at A9. 
121 U.N. Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.105 (Apr. 7, 1999).  The U.N. 
Human Rights Committee adopted these words from the Canadian Human Rights Commission, 
which also described native people’s conditions as “the most pressing human rights issue facing 
Canadians.” 
122 See Allison Bray, Nurse Shortage Shuts Northern Health Centre, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, Sept. 
17, 1999, at A9.  The shortage of nurses is based on Health Canada’s formula for the number of 
nurses that are needed for a community the size of Cross Lake.  There is no hospital in the 
community, only a nurse’s station.  Anyone in need of serious medical attention must travel to 
Winnipeg, which is very expensive for most residents. 
123 The formal presentation occurred at the WHO’s first International Consultation on the Health 
of Indigenous Peoples, Geneva, November 23-26, 1999. 
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Articles 1, 2, and 12 of the U.N. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights.124  The Cree publicized the testimony to the WHO and comments 
by the U.N. Committees to bring international pressure on the Canadian 
government.   
 
           2.  Participation in Transnational Advocacy Networks 
 
The Cree’s U.N. submissions and participation at international meetings 
reveal the growing importance of the international arena in their battle for NFA 
implementation and the protection of their human rights.  By uniting with other 
Cree nations across Canada, the Pimicikamak Cree were able to magnify their 
voice in U.N. fora and challenge Canada’s human rights record.  They have 
collaborated with indigenous groups from across the globe as they communicated 
their grievances at the annual meetings of the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations.  They have also garnered support from environmental organizations, 
particularly in the United States where they have publicized the environmental 
degradation “at the other end of [residents’] power supply.”125  In so doing, the 
Cree have joined transnational advocacy networks on the environment and on 
indigenous rights.126  Groups like the Cree who participate in advocacy networks 
“create categories or frames within which to generate and organize information on 
which to base their campaigns.”127  As they attempt to open up channels of 
communication with states, they follow a “boomerang pattern of influence, . . . 
[where] domestic NGOs bypass their states and directly search out international 
allies to try to bring pressure on their states from outside.”128  
 
Indigenous peoples like the Cree are employing international human rights 
discourse to win recognition as collectivities deserving of protection.  As 
anthropologist Sally Engle Merry has observed:  
 
As various societies mobilize Western law in their demands for human 
rights, they reinterpret and transform Western law in accordance with their 
own local legal conceptions and with the resources provided by the global 
human rights system.  They talk rights, reparations, and claims––the 
                                                 
124  Article 1 of the U.N. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
includes a people’s right to self-determination and to its own means of subsistence.  Article 2 
notes a country’s obligation to guarantee the enunciated human rights without discrimination as to 
race, color, etc.  Article 12 recognizes the right to health and health care.  See supra note 119. 
125 NIEZEN, supra note 72, at 181. 
126 Transnational advocacy networks are “organized to promote causes, principled ideas, and 
norms” across borders.  KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 6, at 8. 
127 Id. at 10. 
128 Id. at 12. 
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language of law––but construct a new law out of the fragments of the 
old.129  
 
This form of popular mobilization has become an important mechanism for 
achieving consciousness-raising both inside and outside the international 
indigenous movement.  The prevalence of international human rights legal 
discourse within campaigns represents “the capacity of constitutionalism and 
contract, rights and legal remedies, to accomplish order, civility, justice, [and] 
empowerment.”130  Indigenous peoples have become “word warriors” who use the 
language of human rights law, including its discourse of rights, reparations, and 
claims, to develop an intercultural dialogue.131  Through this process, they 
translate collective claims for redress for past injustices into narratives of human 
rights and nation-building.   
 
In invoking international human rights language and publicizing violations 
by the Canadian government and Manitoba Hydro, the Cree have allied 
themselves with not only indigenous organizations but also environmental interest 
groups in the United States.  The Cree’s lobbying activities in the United States 
have aimed at making Manitoba Hydro’s American customers aware of the 
negative environmental and social effects produced by the dam that provides their 
electricity.  The rationale of this approach was that if enough people in Minnesota 
became concerned about the situation, they might successfully lobby the Northern 
States Power Company to stop purchasing hydroelectric power from Manitoba 
Hydro.  Such a result would have severely reduced Manitoba Hydro’s profits and 
damaged its reputation, consequently hindering future purchases of its power by 
other American companies.  
 
The Cree spread their message and recruited support from national and 
international environmental justice organizations through a public relations tour 
beginning in late 1998.  They allied with organizations such as the Sierra Club 
and the Audubon Society.132  They were also able to join forces with local 
environmental groups like Minnesotans for an Energy Efficient Economy, which 
was resisting the establishment of a proposed transmission line by Manitoba 
Hydro in the Midwest-Northeast corridor that would threaten farmlands and 
                                                 
129 Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism and Transnational Culture: The Ka Ho’okolokolonui 
Kanaka Maoli Tribunal, Hawai’i, 1993, in HUMAN RIGHTS, CULTURE, AND CONTEXT: 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 28, 29 (Richard A. Wilson ed., 1997).  
130 Jean Comaroff & John L. Comaroff, Millenial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second 
Coming, 12 PUB. CULTURE 291, 328 (2000).  
131 James Tully, The Struggles of Indigenous Peoples for and of Freedom, in POLITICAL THEORY 
AND THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 36, 51 (Duncan Ivison et al. eds., 2000).  
132 NIEZEN, supra note 72, at 181. 
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wildlife habitat.133  They borrowed many of their public relations and lobbying 
tactics from other indigenous groups like the James Bay Cree, who had mounted a 
successful campaign against a proposed Hydro Quebec project in the early 1990s 
by allying with environmental organizations in the Northeast United States.134  As 
a result, the Cree expanded their network of supporters across the border and 
identified their cause with a broader range of values, such as environmental 
justice, that would appeal to the non-indigenous public.  
 
C. Asserting a Right to Self-Determination  
 
 The international human rights norm that is most frequently invoked and 
most internalized among indigenous peoples is the right to self-determination, 
which forms the basis for the Cree’s campaign for political autonomy.  One 
cannot discuss indigenous rights today without encountering the concept of self-
determination.  Defined as a fundamental right of all “peoples” under the 1945 
U.N. Charter, self-determination is understood by indigenous groups as the right 
to “freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, 
and cultural development.”135  Despite the right’s historical association with 
secession, most indigenous peoples favor its realization through the attainment of 
limited sovereignty within states.136 
 
Self-determination refers to the power of peoples to govern themselves 
and to exercise autonomy over their affairs.  As an abstract principle, it has 
political, cultural, social, and economic aspects.  Economic self-determination, for 
instance, describes a people’s control over the development of its land and natural 
resources.  References to self-determination in this Article focus on the concept’s 
political aspect—i.e., an indigenous group’s realization of political autonomy 
through self-government. 
 
                                                 
133 Id. 
134 See id. at 149. 
135 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. 
of Minorities, Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, art. 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (Aug. 26, 1994).  The U.N. 
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is a statement of international human rights 
standards concerning indigenous peoples.  Formulated by the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations, the Draft Declaration is the product of over eight years of extensive deliberations by 
indigenous peoples and U.N. experts.   
136 See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 80-88.  There are some indigenous peoples that do favor secession 
as an application of their right to self-determination.  For example, the Mohawk Nation asserts its 
right to statehood and refuses to acknowledge Canada’s sovereignty over its territory.   
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Self-determination is commonly understood as a sort of relational 
autonomy existing under a principle of non-domination, rather than as sovereign 
independence entailing non-intervention and non-interference.137  In a global 
world where state sovereignty is transforming, “the concept of self-determination 
is capable of embracing much more nuanced interpretations and applications [than 
just independent statehood].”138  S. James Anaya differentiates between two 
normative strains within the right of self-determination––its constitutive aspect 
and its ongoing aspect.  The first aspect refers to the requirement “that the 
governing institutional order be substantially the creation of processes guided by 
the will of the people, or peoples, governed.”139  The second refers to the 
requirement “that the governing institutional order, independently of the processes 
leading to its creation or alteration, be one under which people may live and 
develop freely on a continuous basis.”140  The Pimicikamak Cree’s reinvention of 
their government on their own terms, rather than on the terms of Canada’s Indian 
Act, expresses the constitutive aspect of self-determination.  By designing a 
government that negotiates between local, national, and international law, they are 
striving to achieve the ongoing aspect of self-determination.   
 
Self-determination is widely recognized as a customary international legal 
principle and even as jus cogen, a peremptory norm of universal application.141    
However, there exists no universal model of self-determination that defines 
particular institutional forms or political-juridical frameworks for all contexts.  
Understandings of self-determination differ across groups and shift over time, all 
the while necessitating ongoing negotiations.  The specific features of a regime of 
self-determination should be evaluated “in terms of the historical conditions it 
stems from and for which it tries to provide responses.”142   
 
Thus, self-determination can be understood as a negotiated governance 
agreement between states and peoples.  It has a contextualized meaning, in the 
sense that self-determination models vary according to each group’s 
                                                 
137 For a discussion of this interpretation of self-determination, see Iris M. Young, Two Concepts 
of Self-Determination, in HUMAN RIGHTS: CONCEPTS, CONTESTS, CONTINGENCIES 25, 40 (Austin 
Sarat & Thomas Kearns eds., 2001). 
138 S. James Anaya, The Capacity of International Law to Advance Ethnic or Nationality Rights 
Claims, 75 IOWA L. REV. 837, 842 (1990). 
139 Id. at 81. 
140 Id. 
141 S. James Anaya, Self-Determination as a Collective Human Right Under Contemporary 
International Law, in OPERATIONALIZING THE RIGHT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES TO SELF-
DETERMINATION 3 (Pekka Aikio & Martin Scheinin eds., 2000). 
142 HECTOR DÍAZ POLANCO, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN LATIN AMERICA: THE QUEST FOR SELF-
DETERMINATION 95 (1997). 
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circumstances.  Indigenous peoples would each determine appropriately defined 
models for their relational autonomy within states.  Under the principle of self-
determination, the Pimicikamak Cree are developing a unique self-governance 
model—one that adapts customary norms with Canadian and international law.  
The Cree have developed an innovative strategy of legal mediation as they assert 
their right to self-determination.   
 
III. LEGAL MEDIATION BETWEEN CREE, CANADIAN, AND INTERNATIONAL 
NORMS 
 
In the process of appealing to international human rights law to support 
their campaign for self-determination, the Pimicikamak Cree exercised their 
inherent lawmaking authority and developed a new government—one based on 
legal mediation between their local law and Canadian and international law.  
According to the Assembly of First Nations, the Pimicikamak Cree Nation is “a 
model of accountable governance based on inherent jurisdiction that seeks to 
reconcile tradition with modern circumstances.”143  The case of the Cree 
represents one way in which indigenous nations and other communities can 
design their governments as they assert their political autonomy from states.   
 
In this Part, I elaborate on the unique model of self-government that the 
Cree have developed in pursuit of their right to self-determination.  I first describe 
how the Cree have preserved particular cultural norms and customary legal 
procedures as the basis for their new government.  In the second section, I analyze 
how they have adapted their governing structure and laws to accommodate their 
new relationship with Canada.  I then provide evidence of how they have 
internalized international human rights norms into both their government and 
local political discourse.   Finally, I consider possible limits of the legal mediation 
model for the Cree and other local communities. 
 
A. Preservation of Cultural Norms  
 
PCN [The Pimicikamak Cree Nation] is rediscovering itself, after 
enduring more than a century of governmental repression, disaggregation 
and assimilation.  Despite all, PCN survives.  Its cultural roots are deep.  
PCN’s traditional government, by which it has governed its own affairs 
since time immemorial, has re-awakaned [sic] and has modernized its 
structure and methods.144 
 
                                                 
143 See http://www.sfu.ca/igs/netherton.html. 
144 Pimicikamak Cree Nation, supra note 111, at 22.  
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As the Cree designed a government that borrowed from national and international 
norms, it was important for them to concurrently preserve their cultural norms.  
They sought to liberate themselves from the tribal government that Canada had 
imposed on them under the Indian Act and that had, in their view, led to social 
breakdown within their community.  Associating the Indian Act legal model with 
a history of betrayal by Canada, they aimed to integrate traditional legal practices 
into their government and thereby encourage local political participation.  The 
Cree have restructured many of their political institutions in an effort to maintain 
their cultural integrity. 
 
The revival and adaptation of Cree governing institutions originated in a 
general cultural resurgence within the community over the past decade.  Raymond 
Robinson, the Cree’s former director of economic development, described this 
time as “a new beginning, with respect to . . . being proud to be a Cree and to 
defend[ing] the Cree holistically inside and out, community-wise, politically, and 
against anyone who dared squash it.”145  The Cree elders played an important role 
in this movement for cultural renewal, as a resident affirmed: “Through the 
elders’ teachings, [the Cree] found that [they] have to go back to [their traditional 
Cree value system] to make it work.”146  
 
The Cree have incorporated their traditional dispute resolution approach to 
justice in their new government.  Many Cree felt impaired by “the external nature 
and formality of the provincial court system [that] creates barriers to an effective 
resolution of disputes for families.”147  While sanctions are used for punishment 
in Western judicial systems, the primary objective of the Cree judicial system is to 
reestablish peaceful coexistence between community members and to restore 
harmony.  Instead of relying on an individual-based, adversarial approach to 
achieving justice, the Cree view justice as a perpetual process of maintaining 
balance.  According to this perspective, justice is attained when min-oo-puh-niw 
(harmony), mi-nah-sin (beauty), and mi-nah-yaw-win (well-being) are achieved at 
the levels of individual, family, and community.148  Mi-nah-yaw-win refers to 
both the inseparability of body and spirit and an intimate connection between 
                                                 
145 Interview with Raymond Robinson, Former Director of Economic Development, Pimicikamak 
Cree Nation, in Cross Lake, Manitoba (Aug. 6, 1999). 
146 Interview with Darwin Paupanekis, Resident of the Pimicikamak Cree Nation, in Cross Lake, 
Manitoba (July 13, 1999). 
147 AWASIS AGENCY OF NORTHERN MANITOBA, FIRST NATIONS FAMILY JUSTICE (Awasis Agency 
of Northern Manitoba 1997).  This was distributed as a booklet on August 12, 1999, during the 
Women Wellness Healing Conference, Cross Lake. 
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human life and the natural world.149  As opposed to the more limited Western 
definition of wellness as “the state of being well or in good health,”150 the Cree 
concept also extends to a balanced relationship with the natural environment.   
 
 Achieving mi-nah-yaw-win through the Cree dispute resolution process 
necessitates the use of consensus decision-making, a common practice among 
many indigenous peoples, including the Navajo in the United States.  In the 
Navajo judicial system, “the proper way to handle a dispute or a breach of the 
peace [is] to give everyone who had any interest or knowledge of the matter a 
chance to speak.  Everyone’s input [is] taken into consideration.  Justice [comes] 
from the participation of all interested persons in resolving the problem and 
restoring harmony.”151  The Cree have implemented this type of procedure as part 
of their governing process, as is evident in their monthly General Assembly 
meetings, their formulation of a community development plan, and their design of 
a new government.152   
 
B.  Adaptation of Cree Government and Laws 
 
As the Cree began to design their new government, they debated over 
whether it should be based only on Cree customary law or should also integrate 
Canadian and international legal norms.  They decided that they needed a 
government that followed the latter model, one that mediated between multiple 
legal systems by adapting local laws to accommodate other legal norms.  They 
recognized that simply returning to customary practices was insufficient for 
effective self-governance.  A government based exclusively on customary law 
would ignore the outside institutions that interact with contemporary Cree society.  
In asserting their autonomy, the Cree realized that their government must be 
recognized as legitimate by the Canadian government and the international 
community, and that it must be capable of engaging in negotiations with them.  
As Cree Chief John Miswagon explained:  “Traditional ways provide the 
framework; but we also need[ed] to catch up with more than a century of modern 
governance. . . . We see sovereignty . . . as a matter of reconciliation.  We seek to 
harmonize the way we administer our laws with the administration of other 
                                                 
149 Ronald Niezen, Speech at the Interchurch Inquiry into Northern Hydro Development (June 22, 
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150 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). 
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152 The development of A New Relationship, the Pimicikamak Cree Nation’s working paper on 
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Canadian laws.”153  Achieving legal validation from international and state 
authorities would also educate those outside the community about Cree legal 
norms and cultural practices.  
 
 The Cree’s written codification of laws exemplifies how they have 
adapted their traditional legal norms to accommodate their new relationship with 
outside institutions.  Although their culture has a historically oral tradition, the 
Cree began to write their laws down because “that’s the way the white man does 
things and that’s the only way [the Cree] can convey [their] message to them.”154  
Sandy Beardy, the former Chief of their Council of Elders, summarized the 
necessity of documenting Cree laws: “We had our own laws before the Europeans 
came, but now we’re writing them down so others won’t forget, in case later on 
they try to take away our land from us again.”155  Thus, the Cree have recognized 
that their contemporary relationship with the outside world requires that their laws 
be accessible to and comprehensible by non-indigenous peoples.  Written laws 
facilitate communication with external governments and international bodies. 
 
 Based on the principle of inherent jurisdiction, the Cree ratified The First 
Written Law in 1996, which laid the foundation for their adaptation of customary 
practices.156  The law codifies oral Cree traditions to provide “improved 
opportunity for Crown parties and others to comprehend the democratic (but 
culturally different) concepts of Cree government.”157  It outlines the 
constitutional powers of the Pimicikamak Cree Nation, including the new 
government’s four council structure and its legislative procedures.  According to 
The First Written Law, the Cree government “is based on, and expands upon, 
existing traditional law, . . . reconcil[ing] the [Canadian] Indian Act government 
with inherent governance.”158  The integration of Indian Act entities, such as the 
positions of Chief and Council, into the Cree’s customary political system reflects 
the their creative accommodation of Canadian legal structures.   
 
                                                 
153 Chief John Miswagon, Speech to the Frontier Center for Public Policy:  A Government of Our 
Own, (Apr. 21, 2005). 
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156 PIMICIKAMAK CREE NATION LAWS, The First Written Law (1996).   
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The Cree have incorporated the legal entities of Chief and Council, which 
did not exist in Cree tradition, to facilitate an orderly transition to self-
government.  Their working paper, A New Relationship, explains why they have 
retained these entities under The First Written Law: 
 
[The First Written Law] expands upon [traditional law] because it comes 
to terms with the (offensive) existence of and also the (practical) need for 
Chief and Council as an executive arm of government.  ‘Offensive’ 
because it was a violation of our human right of self-determination by 
means of the Indian Act. . . .  ‘Practical’ because the world has changed 
much and normal evolution of Cree governance has been suppressed for 
generations.159 
 
At the same time, the Cree have altered the powers of Chief and Council in order 
to reconcile them with their traditional political system.  The Chief and Council 
still represent the backbone of their government, with the power to initiate written 
laws under their inherent jurisdiction.  Yet, instead of following the Indian Act’s 
delegation of all political power to the Chief and Council, the Cree have 
redistributed some of their administrative authority to three traditional bodies, all 
of which operate by consensus: the Council of Elders, the Women’s Council, and 
the Youth Council.  The Chief and Council form the executive branch of this new 
four council system and conduct the day-to-day administrative affairs in 
cooperation with the federal and provincial governments. 
 
 Following The First Written Law, the Cree have continued to pass 
additional laws that adapt or replace provisions of the Indian Act.  Chief 
Miswagon noted that this process is incremental: “We are replacing [the Indian 
Act] at our own pace, in our own way, with something that works for us.”160  To 
date, they have adopted five laws according to this procedure—The First Written 
Law, The Pimicikamak NFA Implementation Law, The Pimicikamak Okimawin 
Trust and Hydro Payment Law, The Citizenship Law, and The Election Law—
and are in the process of drafting a Resource Management Law and Financial 
Administration Law.161  The Citizenship Law and Election Law nullify federal 
jurisdiction over citizenship and election procedures and redefine the membership 
and voting criteria for the Cree, even incorporating the Canadian Supreme Court 
Corbiere decision regarding the rights of off-reserve Indians.162  The Hydro 
                                                 
159 Pimicikamak Cree Nation, supra note 111, at 9. 
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Payment Law mandates that hydroelectric bill payments be placed in a trust, 
instead of being paid to Manitoba Hydro, until the NFA is implemented according 
to its spirit and intent.  These local laws, which integrate Cree customary law with 
Canadian legal concepts, permit the Cree to exercise authority over their 
economic administration, membership, elections, and political institutions.   
 
C.  Incorporation of International Norms  
 
Having been exposed to international human rights norms through their 
political mobilization, the Cree began to incorporate these norms into both their 
official discourse (e.g., their constitution, laws, and formal statements to external 
parties) and their local political discourse.  As part of their new constitution, the 
Cree have included language from the U.N.’s International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and its International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights.163  They have also officially recognized that the authority of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms must apply “to every Law of [the Pimicikamak] 
First Nation.”164  Finally, the Cree have adopted new laws and restructured their 
government to protect individuals within their community, which represents the 
first time that they have mandated the protection of the rights of historically 
discriminated groups like women.  This is a radical step for the Cree who, like 
other indigenous peoples, have often focused on the protection of group rights 
rather than individual rights.   
 
The Cree assert the dual importance of individual and group rights in their 
working paper, A New Relationship: 
 
We have . . . rights as individuals and a people. . . .  We intend from this 
time onward to subject the conditions facing our people to ongoing human 
rights scrutiny, as is entirely appropriate. . . .  It is established that the 
human rights of peoples and nations are the legitimate business of other 
peoples and nations, and that any intervention concerning fundamental 
human rights is not interference.  We will continue to call on others, 
including an international community, who are concerned with human 
                                                                                                                                     
right to vote in on-reserve elections.  In accordance with this decision, the Cree Citizenship Law 
broadened the Indian Act definition of a band member to include off-reserve Indians, thus making 
them eligible to vote in elections and run for office. 
163 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 119, art. 1, paras. 1 & 3; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 119, art. 1, paras. 1 & 
3.  
164 The First Written Law, supra note 156.  
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rights to intervene to ensure that our human rights are respected (emphasis 
added).165   
 
They also recognize their obligation to prevent human rights violations within 
other indigenous communities: “We also intend to take all legitimate steps to 
ensure that the human rights of our brothers and sisters in our communities . . . are 
respected. . . .  It is our obligation to intervene and help to ensure that they are 
restored and respected.”166  In this way, the Cree have codified certain 
international human rights norms.   
 
The Cree have particularly focused on the rights of women and youth in 
the design of their four council government.  While participating at U.N. human 
rights meetings, Cree representatives heard the grievances of women’s and 
children’s rights groups and reported their concerns back to their communities.  
Empowered with the knowledge that they had internationally recognized rights, 
women like Rita Monias, a member of the Cree’s Women’s Council, began to 
educate themselves about human rights through Internet research and at the 
library of a local university.167  Monias has observed that, prior to the formation 
of their new government, people had criticized her for speaking about her rights 
under international law.168  However, with the development of new laws and the 
increased community awareness of international human rights norms, she had the 
opportunity to realize those rights by lobbying for women to have more decision-
making power.   
 
As a result of lobbying activities by women, the Cree adjusted the 
functions of the traditional councils under The First Written Law to give more 
voice to women and youth.  The law removes primary authority over law-making 
from the Council of Elders and shifts the customary role of the Women’s Council 
from an executive function to a legislative one that is more prominent in everyday 
affairs.  Whereas the Women’s Council formerly had only a consultative role in 
the law-making process, it now has veto power over all laws and supervises 
elections of the Chief and Council.169  The law also confers a legislative role on 
the Youth Council, which traditionally lacked governing responsibilities.   
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The Cree’s law-making process now consists of the following steps: (i) A 
law is proposed by the Chief and Council.  (ii) The law must be approved through 
traditional consensus by the Council of Elders and the Women’s Council and be 
referred to the Youth Council for consultation.  The Council of Elders and 
Women’s Council can also refer the law back to the Chief and Council with a 
recommendation that it be amended before being reconsidered for approval.  (iii) 
The proposed law then requires public approval at a General Assembly meeting 
held through consensus decision-making.  If it is not approved, the law is referred 
back to the Chief and Council for redrafting.  (iv) The law and any amendments 
made to it are adopted and signed by the Chief and Council.  Under this new 
legislative process, the three councils and the Cree citizens cooperate with the 
Chief and Council in the formulation and approval of laws.   
 
 The prominent role of women in the current Cree administration has been 
widely celebrated by community members who felt underrepresented by the 
previous system.  Many women have expressed their support for the new 
government and its recognition of their rights, and have, as a result, increased 
their participation in the political process.  During a General Assembly meeting, 
Patsy Corierre, a member of the Women’s Council, declared that the Cree’s latest 
laws “are for the children, for the future generations.  [The people] are finally 
going in the right direction.”170  Women are now among the political leaders 
determining the nation’s future, and they give credit to the international human 
rights movement for influencing the structure of the new government. 
 
The Youth Council’s increased political power reflects the growing 
percentage of young people within the reservation, where about 50 percent of 
residents are under the age of 20.171  Gerald Frogg, a former Youth Council 
member and candidate for Council in the August 1999 election, expressed his 
excitement for the enhanced opportunities for youth in the Cree government: 
“Before, we were in the background, we never really got a chance to say much.  
But since the new government, we have a lot of power. . . .  We actually have a 
say about the things that are going on in our community.”172  Although political 
apathy still exists among many young residents, they are becoming more involved 
as they realize their decision-making power under the new laws.  
 
While international human rights norms, such as the rights of youth and 
women, have become embedded in official legal documents, they are also starting 
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to shape how law is talked about in local settings.173  Cree politicians have begun 
to use the language of rights within their community when deliberating over their 
local government.  For instance, during the General Assembly meeting when the 
Cree public voted on the proposed Election Law, Council representatives justified 
the assertion of the Pimicikamak Cree Nation’s inherent jurisdiction by 
distributing copies of the two U.N. international human rights covenants.174  They 
explained the significance of international law as a foundation for their self-
government and educated the community on how they were seeking to realize 
their rights. Politicians further appealed to the symbolic power of international 
human rights discourse in the ensuing local election. 
 
In preparation for their first election for Chief and Council administered 
under the Election Law, the candidates invoked international human rights norms 
as rhetorical devices in campaign slogans and televised speeches.  Posters for the 
reelection of Council member Nelson Miller featured the slogan: “Vote Nelson 
Miller for strong self-determined PCN [Pimicikamak Cree Nation] governance 
and human rights” (emphases added).  The publicly distributed pamphlets for the 
reelection of Chief Roland Robinson similarly alluded to international legal 
principles in declaring Robinson’s support for “aboriginal, cultural, economic, 
social, political, civil, and human rights.”  In the debate among candidates for 
Chief in 1999, Robinson argued that the Canadian government’s underfunding is 
a violation of the Cree’s “fundamental human rights under the U.N. and the 
Canadian charter rights.”175  Thus, the Cree are appropriating rights language to 
secure not only external legitimacy for their incipient government but also its 
acceptance within the community.    
 
As rights language begins to penetrate the Cree’s laws and political 
discourse, it may become vernacularized or “adapted to local institutions and 
meanings.”176  In other words, the Cree may translate or redefine human rights 
concepts in their everyday life in terms of existing cultural norms and values.  In 
my study, it was not yet clear whether the Cree are adopting international human 
rights norms as simply a strategic weapon in their campaign against Canada or 
whether the norms are truly becoming vernacularized.  Further empirical research 
is necessary to determine the degree to which international human rights norms 
have become internalized in the Pimicikamak Cree Nation and have shaped their 
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informal communications and everyday practice—e.g., whether the Cree have 
begun to think about local grievances as human rights violations and whether they 
would continue to use human rights language within their community if their 
conflict with Canada were resolved.177  It is possible that norm internalization is 
more of a continuum, ranging from formal adoption to vernacularization, and that 
it may take years to determine at which point a community falls.178  
 
D.  The Limits of Legal Mediation 
 
 Having described the Cree’s government as a model of legal mediation, I 
would like to now consider the limits of this model for the Cree and other local 
communities.  That is, what are the necessary conditions under which legal 
mediation will most likely work?  In what circumstances is this model not as 
appropriate?  Based on my study of the Pimicikamak Cree Nation and other 
indigenous communities, I have identified two types of obstacles: external and 
internal.      
 
 1.  External Obstacles 
 
 The effectiveness of the legal mediation model is closely linked to state 
cooperation.  In order for local appeals to international law to be influential, state 
governments must feel vulnerable to international pressure and care about their 
public image.  This approach works best in countries like Canada, a nation that 
projects an image of protecting human rights and wants to be viewed as doing so 
by the international community.  Such countries are more willing to negotiate 
with local communities and even adapt their laws to accommodate customary 
norms.  However, even countries like Canada, which have pledged their support 
for indigenous self-government in official literature and public statements, have 
been reluctant in taking actions to realize that pledge.179  This reluctance is 
exemplified in Canada’s objections to the Cree’s recently adopted Election Law.   
 
Canada did not protest the Cree’s emerging self-government process until 
the passage of the Cree’s Election Law in June 1999.  The law directly replaced 
Section 74 of the Indian Act, which details the election procedures for indigenous 
                                                 
177 See id. at 42. 
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communities, with provisions based on Cree customary norms.180  Their election 
under the law was the first one held by a Canadian Indian nation to allow off-
reserve members the opportunity to vote, based on revised membership criteria 
outlined in the Cree’s new Citizenship Law.  The Indian Act prohibits off-reserve 
Indians from the privileges granted to citizens, including the right to vote in 
community elections.  In addressing this issue, the Canadian Supreme Court 
declared the Indian Act’s denial of voting rights for off-reserve residents as 
unconstitutional.181  The Pimicikamak Cree cited this case when developing their 
own citizenship provisions that recognize the status of off-reserve Indians. 
 
Although Cree officials had pursued a process of open communication 
with the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs in Winnipeg and Ottawa 
during the months that they developed the Election Law, the federal government 
rejected the legitimacy of their first election under this law and threatened not to 
recognize the newly elected Chief.  On August 19, 1999, the Canadian 
Department of Indian and Northern Affairs issued a statement to the Cree 
declaring its refusal to honor the results of the election due to a lack of “evidence 
that the changes to [the Pimicikamak Cree Nation’s] election and membership act 
were arrived at through a democratic process.”182  The Canadian government did 
not believe that a majority of Cree electors had accepted the new election 
procedures, despite the fact that the General Assembly had voted unanimously to 
adopt the law on June 30, 1999, and a record number of people turned out to vote 
at the August 17th election.  
 
After intense pressure by the Pimicikamak Cree and other indigenous 
groups in Canada, as well as by representatives from international human rights 
NGOs, Canada decided in late September to recognize the new Election Law.  It 
realized the threat of negative international publicity if it refused to negotiate a 
self-government arrangement.  Granting this one concession by accepting the 
Election Law of a small tribe in northern Manitoba was preferable to a long 
drawn-out battle with the Cree, particularly given the resistance and international 
attention that the Cree had brought against the federal government.  This incident 
illustrates how indigenous groups should continue to place international pressure 
on their governments as they pursue an incremental strategy for self-government.  
The Cree’s legal mediation approach demonstrates the level of success that can be 
achieved against external obstacles if communities incrementally pass laws that 
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replace aspects of federal law, incorporate international norms, and adapt local 
norms, while continuing to participate in transnational advocacy networks. 
 
 2.  Internal Obstacles 
 
 The second type of challenge to the legal mediation approach is internal.  
A community may be divided over whether it should create a new government 
based on local norms or whether it is more prudent to retain a state-imposed 
government that does not borrow from local norms.  This type of internal dispute 
occurred among the Hopi, an American Indian nation in which a faction of 
members have tried to reconcile their traditional norms with the current 
government.  Between 1948 and the late 1980s, a “traditionalist” movement 
emerged on the Hopi reservation that was independent of the Hopi Tribal Council, 
the governing institution recognized by the U.S. government and established by 
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.  This movement attempted to “create a 
new political path that is the obverse of the U.S. government’s intrusion into Hopi 
life and its creation of the Hopi Tribal Council.”183  Traditionalists embraced the 
village-based Hopi governing structure, organized under the kikmongwis or 
village chiefs, as the basis of their new leadership, and they attempted to 
reorganize the Hopi political system.184   
 
 As a result of internal tension, two concurrent bodies were claiming 
authority over the Hopi community: the Tribal Council (recognized by the United 
States) and the traditional Hopi government.  A power conflict developed between 
Council leaders and traditionalists, creating many obstacles to community unity 
and administrative efficiency.  Factionalism caused the traditional village 
leadership to become “marginalized and displaced from the political center stage 
of tribal life.”185  Despite growing community support for the traditionalists’ 
preservation of Hopi culture, the Tribal Council remained the only conduit for 
distributing U.S. government benefits.  Yet, the Tribal Council was often unable 
to establish a quorum “because traditional village leaders sometimes refuse[d] to 
certify elected representatives.”186   
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 The Hopi case––featuring “acquiescence to the economic and political 
system of the intrusive dominant European-derived culture on the one hand and, 
on the other, phrased as traditionalism, an ideology of independence of, and scorn 
for, the intruders and their system”187—offers several lessons to other local 
communities, including the Pimicikamak Cree Nation.  Jurisdictional 
complications and internal conflicts similar to those in the Hopi community can 
plague the self-government process.  Notably different from the Cree case, the 
Hopi traditionalists did not attempt to negotiate Hopi law with U.S. or 
international law but instead strived to create a government based exclusively on 
customary norms.  Nonetheless, even within a government based on legal 
mediation, internal factionalism may threaten its stability and the cultural 
cohesiveness of the community.  Moreover, if a group’s new political leadership 
is unclear and contested, this may also decrease the likelihood that the state will 
recognize the recently established local government.  
 
 Another possible internal challenge may emerge over what actually 
constitute the “traditional” local norms that should form the basis of a new 
government.  This dispute occurred within the Pimicikamak Cree community, in 
which there exist many different interpretations of customary law.  As one Cree 
representative has noted, “The Chief and Council say they are proud to be Cree, 
but they don’t really know what it means to be Cree.”188  The process of adapting 
customary practices into Cree local government depends on people’s consensus 
over what they consider to be the local norms.  While the entire community may 
agree on the need to return to their traditional governing institutions, several key 
questions must first be addressed:  Who defines what is considered “traditional?”  
Is there an objective set of customary norms?  Such issues hinder groups who 
want to present a united voice when seeking political autonomy.   
 
 Among the Cree, the debate over what procedures are considered 
democratic according to traditional standards has heated up in recent years.189  
There have been criticisms that the local government does not adequately model 
its consensus decision-making procedures on those followed years ago by the 
Cree, and that they are instead a production of non-native influences.190  The 
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identification and interpretation of traditional norms has been primarily 
determined by the political representatives from the four governing councils, 
leading to frustration among the general public and lower-ranked employees in 
the tribal government.  Thus, in order to address these internal challenges, it is 
important for groups like the Cree to continuously engage in consultations with 





Legal mediation presents a model for how local communities can integrate 
international and state norms into their legal institutions while also adapting local 
laws and practices.  I argue that indigenous communities like the Pimicikamak 
Cree Nation are engaging in legal mediation as they negotiate among multiple 
normative commitments.  While mobilizing an international campaign for self-
determination, the Cree have joined transnational advocacy networks and become 
familiar with international human rights norms.  Their new government mediates 
between different legal systems by borrowing from Canadian and international 
law and adapting cultural norms and customary practices. 
 
 This ethnographic study seeks to contribute to international legal 
scholarship on norm diffusion by examining the local process by which 
international norms are adopted.  Legal mediation explains how international 
norms can become embedded in local communities and interact with customary 
and state norms.  It builds on theories of legal pluralism by offering a model of 
how local communities can accommodate multiple legal systems.  Yet, it also 
extends existing frameworks by focusing not just on the interaction of legal orders 
but also on the adaptation of local norms and the shaping of local law-making in 
the process of integrating state and international norms. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
governmental, business sector jobs.  According to a survey of 150 people conducted in 1998–1999 
by the Cross Lake Community and Economic Development Organization, the average monthly 
income earned from employment is $638.26 while social assistance provides $483.50 to the 
unemployed.  Due to the participation of elected officials (the Chief and Council and Chiefs of the 
Council of Elders, Women’s Council, and Youth Council) in the national and international 
political arenas, they have been criticized by the unemployed as not truly understanding, or 
participating in, Cree customs and simply “show boating” their knowledge of traditions.  Interview 
with anonymous member of the Pimicikamak Cree community, supra note 188.  Dissenters 
believe that the tribal leaders are “deploying the rhetoric of [Cree] values as a badge of 
legitimacy.”  Russel Barsh, The Challenge of Indigenous Self-Government, 26 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 277, 299 (1993). 
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 This model is only one way in which legal mediation can operate with 
respect to international norms.  Local communities are not the only actors that can 
initiate contact with international norms; states may also do so.  For example, 
states can invoke international norms in an attempt to hold local communities up 
to international legal standards.  They can leverage international pressure against 
communities whose cultural practices or religious laws fail to abide by 
international human rights norms, such as women’s rights.  In such instances, 
states invoke international law to influence local norms, or at least seek to end 
practices they deem as violating universal human rights.  Local communities are 
then under great pressure to engage in legal mediation and to adapt local norms to 
comply with international standards.  Unlike in the form of legal mediation that I 
discuss in this article, local actors in such situations are not the key players in 
shaping how international norms get internalized within their communities.  They 
have much less influence in determining how local customs and laws will be 
negotiated since they are under pressure by states and international human rights 
groups.   
 
 One must therefore consider the power relations between the local, 
national, and global legal systems, and how the process of legal mediation can be 
strategically employed by either local actors or states.  There are also power 
inequalities among states such that some states are more receptive to international 
pressure and to a legal mediation model than are others.  Such factors reveal the 
constantly changing interaction between multiple normative communities and 
suggest diverse models of legal mediation.    
 
 
 
